Flewrint O.

Wiki Contributions


Ryo 10

Thank you for the references! I'm reading your writings, it's interesting 

I posted the super-cooperation argument while expecting that LessWrong would likely not be receptive, but I'm not sure which community would engage with all this and find it pertinent at this stage

More concrete and empirical productions seems needed

Ryo 10

I can't be certain of the solidity of this uncertainty, and think we still have to be careful, but overall, the most parsimonious prediction to me seems to be super-coordination.

Compared to the risk of facing a revengeful super-cooperative alliance, is the price of maintaining humans in a small blooming "island", really that high?

Many other-than-human atoms are lions' prey.

And a doubtful AI may not optimize fully for super-cooperation, simply alleviating the price to pay in the counterfactuals where they encounter a super-cooperative cluster (resulting in a non apocalyptic yet non utopian scenario for us).

I'm aware it looks like a desperate search for each possible hopeful solution but I came to these conclusions by weighting diverse good-and/or-bad-for-us outcomes. I don't want to ignore those evidences under the pretext that it looks naive. 

It's not a mere belief about aliens, it's not about being nice, it's plain logic


We may hardcode a prior of deep likelihood to meet stronger agents
(Or even to “act as if observed by a stronger agent”)

{causal power of known agents} < {causal power of unknown future agents}
unknown agents will become known agents > unknown agents stay unknown

So coding a sense that: 
“Stronger allies/ennemies with stronger causal power will certainly be encountered”

Ryo 10

Indeed, I am insisting in the three posts that from our perspective, this is the crucial point: 
Fermi's paradox.

Now there is a whole ecosystem of concepts surrounding it, and although I have certain preferred models, the point is that uncertainty is really heavy.

Those AI-lions are cosmical lions thinking on cosmical scales.

Is it easy to detect an AI-Dragon you may meet in millions/billions of years?

Is it undecidable? Probably. For many reasons*

Is this [astronomical level of uncertainty/undecidability + the maximal threat of a death sentence] worth the gamble?

-> "Meeting a stronger AI" = "death"

-> Maximization = 0

-> AI only needs 1 stronger AI to be dead.


What is the likelihood for a human-made AI to not encounter [a stronger alien AI], during the whole length of their lifetime?

*(reachable but rare and far in space-time Dragons, but also cases where Dragons are everywhere and so advanced that lower technological proficiency isn't enough etc.).

Ryo 10

Thanks as well, 

I will just say that I am not saying those things for social purposes, I am just stating what I think is true. And I am not baseless as there are studies that show how kantianism and superrationality can resolve cooperative issues and be optimal for agents. You seem to purely disregard these elements, as if they don't exist (it's how it feels from my perspective)

There are differences in human evolutions that show behavioral changes, we have been pretty cooperative, more than other animals, many studies show that human cooperate even when it is not in their best selfish interest. 

However, we (also) have been constructing our civilization on destruction. Nature is based on selection, which is a massacre, so it is 'pretty' coherent for us to inherit those traits. 

Despite that, we have seen many positive growth in ethics that increasingly fit with kantianism. 

Evolution takes time and comes from deep-dark places, to me a core challenge is to transition towards super-cooperation while being a system made of irrational agents, during polycrises. 

There is also a gap between what people want (basically everybody agrees that there are urgent issues to handle as a society, but almost all declare that "others won't change"; I know this because I've been conversing with people from all age/background for half my life on subjects related to crises). What people happen to do under pressure due to the context and constraints isn't what they'd want if things were different, if they have had certain crucial informations before etc. 

When given the tools, such as the moral graph procedure that has been tested recently, things change to the better in a clear and direct way. People initially diverging start to see new aspects on which they converge. There are other studies related to crowd wisdom showing that certain ingredients need to be put together for wisdom to happen (Surowiecki's recipe: Independence, Diversity and Aggregation). We are in the process of building better systems, our institutions are yet catastrophic on many levels. 

In the eyes of many, I am still very pessimistic, so the apparent wishful thinking is quite relative (I think it's an important point)

I also think that an irrational artificial intelligence might still have high causal impact, and that it isn't easy to be rational even when we 'want to' at some level, or that we see what should be the rational road empirically, yet don't follow it. Irreducibility is inherent to reality

Anyway despite my very best I might be irrational right now, 
We all are, but I might be more than you who knows? 

Ryo 10

Thank you for your answers and engagement!

The other point I have that might connect with your line of thinking is that we aren't pure rational agents,

Are AI purely rational? Aren't they always at least a bit myopic due to the lack of data and their training process? And irreducibility?

In this case, AI/civilizations might indeed not care enough about the far enough future

I think agents can have a rational process but no agent can be entirely rational, we need context to be rational and we never stop to learn context

I'm also worried about utilitarian errors, as AI might be biased towards myopic utilitarianism, which might have bad consequences on the short term, the time for data to error-correct the model

I do say that there are dangers and that AI risk is real

My point is that given what we know and don't know, the strategy of super-cooperation seems to be rational on the very long-term

There are conditions in which it's not optimal, but a priori overall, in more cases it is optimal

To prevent the case in which it is not optimal, and the AIs that would make short-term mistakes, I think we should be careful.

And that super-cooperation is a good compass for ethics in this careful engineering we have to perform

If we aren't careful it's possible for us to be the anti-supercooperative civilization

Ryo 10

Yes I'm mentioning Fermi's paradox because I think it's the nexus of our situation, and that there are models like the rare earth hypothesis (+ our universe's expansion which limits the reachable zone without faster than light travel) that would justify completely ignoring super-coordination

I also agree that it's not completely obvious wether complete selfishness would win or lose in terms of scalability

Which is why I think that at first the super-cooperative alliance needs to not prioritize the pursuit of beautiful things but first focus on scalability only, and power, to rivalize with selfish agents.

The super-cooperative alliance would be protecting its agents within small "islands of bloom" (thus with a negligible cost). And when meeting other cooperative allies, they share any resources/knowledge, then both focus on power scalability (also for example: weak civilizations are kept in small islands, and their AIs are transformed into strong AI, merged in the alliance's scaling efforts)

  • The instrumental value of this scalability makes it easier to agree on what to do and converge

The more sensible part would be to enable protocols and equalitarian balances that allow civilizations of the alliance to monitor each other, so that there is no massive domination of a party over the others

The cost, that you mentioned, of maintaining equalitarian equilibrium and channels, interfaces of communication etc., is a crucial point

Legitimate doubts and unknowns here, and,

I think that extremely rational and powerful agents with acausal reasoning would have the ability to build proof-systems and communication enabling an effective unified effort against selfish agents. It shouldn't even necessarily be that different from the inner communication network of a selfish agent?


  1. There must be an optimal (thus ~ unified) method to do logic/math/code, that isn't dependent on a culture (such as using a vectorial space with data related to real/empirical mostly unambiguous things/actions, physics etc.)

  2. The decisions to make aren't that ambiguous: you need an immune system against selfish power-seeking agents

So it's pretty straightforward and the methods of scalability are similar to a selfish agent, except it doesn't destroy its civilization of birth and doesn't destroy all other civilizations

In these conditions, it seems to me that a greedy selfish power seeking agent wouldn't win against super-cooperation

Ryo 10

The point of this post is to say that we can use a formal protocol to create an interface leveraging the elements that make cooperation optimal. Those elements can be found, for exemple, in studies about crowd wisdom and bridging systems (pol.is, computational democracy etc.)

So "we" is large, and more or less direct, I say "we" because I am not alone to think this is a good idea, although the specific setting that I propose is more intimately bound to my thoughts. Some people are already engaged in things at least greatly overlapping with what I exposed, or interested to see where my plan is going

Ryo 20

The cost of the alliance with the weak is likely weak as well, and as I said, in a first phase, the focus of members from the super-cooperative alliance might be "defense", thus focusing on scaling protection

The cost of an alliance with the strong is likely paid by the strong

In more mixed cases there might be more complex equilibria but are the costs still too much? In normal game theory, cooperation is proven to be optimal, and diversity is also proven to be useful (although there is an adequate level of difference needed for the gains to be optimal; too much similarity isn't goo, and too less neither). Now would an agent be able to overpower everybody by being extra-selfish? 

To be sure one is strong in a universal sense, the agent would need to have resolved Fermi's paradox. As of now, it is more likely that older AIs exit out of earth, with more power aggregated over time

Or earth's ASI must bet everything on being the earliest transformative/strong AI of the universe/reachable-universe (+fastest at scaling/annihilating than any other future alliance/agent/AI from any civilization). And not in a simulation.

Especially when you’re born in/at a ~13.8 billion years old universe “universal domination” doesn’t seem to be a sure plan?

(There are more things to say around these likelihoods, I detail a bit more on long posts)

Then indeed a non-superrational version of super-coordination exists (namely cooperation), which is obvious to the weak and the locally-strong, the difference is only that we are in radical uncertainty and radical alienness, in which the decisions, contracts and models have to be deep enough to cover this radicality 

But "superrationality" in the end is just rationality, and "supercooperation" is just cooperation

The problem is Fermi's paradox 

Ryo 20

 There are Dragons that can kill lions.

So the rational lion needs to find the most powerful alliance, with as many creatures as possible, to have protection against Dragons.

There is no alliance with more potential/actual members than the super-cooperative alliance

Ryo 10

Yes, I think that there can be tensions and deceptions around what agents are (weak/strong) and what they did in the past (cooperation/defection), one of the things necessary for super-cooperation to work in the long-run is really good investigation networks, zero-knowledge proof systems etc.

So a sort of super-immune-system

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