I'm reminded of this part from HP:MoR when
Harry's following Voldemort to what seems to be his doom.
Suppose, said that last remaining part, suppose we try to condition on the fact that we win this, or at least get out of this alive. If someone told you as a fact that you had survived, or even won, somehow made everything turn out okay, what would you think had happened—
Not legitimate procedure, whispered Ravenclaw, the universe doesn’t work like that, we’re just going to die
I never understood why this was considered illegitimate. If we have a pa...
E.g., the snake wouldn't have human-like reward circuitry, so it would probably learn to value very different things than a human which went through the same experiences.
So in this case I think we then agree. But it seems a bit at odds with the 4% weighting of genetic roots. If we agree the snake would exhibit very different values despite experiencing the 'human learning' part then shouldn't this adjust the 60% weight you grant that? Seems the evolutionary roots made all the difference for the snake. Which is the whole point about initial AGI alignm...
I would consider that you cannot weight these things along a single metric. Say evolution -> human values really is only 4% of your value alignment, if that 4% is the fundamental core then it's not part of the sum of all values, but a coefficient or a base where the other stuff is the exponent. It's the hardware the software has to be loaded on, but not totally tabula rasa either.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but this would assume that if you could somehow make a human level intelligence snake and raise it in human society (let's pretend nobody considers it ...
I'm out of my depth with mathematical and logical proofs, but wouldn't this be just rhetorical engagement with a hypothetical. In probability theory we can use conditionals, this feels like doing that.