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A problem with Timeless Decision Theory (TDT)

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According to information his family graciously posted to his blog, the cause of death was occlusive coronary artery disease with cardiomegaly.

It occurs to me that my references above to "coherence" should be replaced by "coherence & P(T)=1 & reflective consistency". That is, there exists (if I understand correctly) a P that has all three properties, and that assigns the probabilities listed above. Therefore, those three properties would n...(read more)

Wow, this is great work--congratulations! If it pans out, it bridges a really fundamental gap.

I'm still digesting the idea, and perhaps I'm jumping the gun here, but I'm trying to envision a UDT (or TDT) agent using the sense of subjective probability you define. It seems to me that an agent can g...(read more)

If John's physician prescribed a burdensome treatment because of a test whose false-positive rate is 99.9999%, John needs a lawyer rather than a statistician. :)

> In April 2010 Gary Drescher proposed the "Agent simulates predictor" problem, or ASP, that shows how agents with lots of computational power sometimes fare worse than agents with limited resources.

Just to give due credit: Wei Dai and others had already discussed Prisoner's Dilemma scenarios that...(read more)

and for an illuminating reason - the algorithm is only run with one set of information

That's not essential, though (see the dual-simulation variant in Good and Real).

Just to clarify, I think your analysis here doesn't apply to the transparent-boxes version that I presented in Good and Real. There, the predictor's task is not necessarily to predict what the agent does for real, but rather to predict what the agent would do in the event that the agent sees $1M in ...(read more)

>> 2) "Agent simulates predictor" > > This basically says that the predictor is a rock, doesn't depend on agent's decision,

True, it doesn't "depend" on the agent's decision in the specific sense of "dependency" defined by currently-formulated UDT. The question (as with any proposed DT) is whether...(read more)

I assume (please correct me if I'm mistaken) that you're referring to the payout-value as the output of the world program. In that case, a P-style program and a P1-style program can certainly give different outputs for some hypothetical outputs of S (for the given inputs). However, both programs's p...(read more)

My concern is that there may be several world-programs that correspond faithfully to a given problem description, but that correspond to different analyses, yielding different decision prescriptions, as illustrated by the P1 example above. (Upon further consideration, I should probably modify P1 to ...(read more)