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People say the fact that there are many gods neutralizes Pascal’s wager - but I don't understand that at all. It seems to be a total non sequetor. Sure, it opens the door to other wagers being valid, but that is a different issue.

Lets say I have a simple game against you where, if I choose 1 I win a lotto ticket and if I choose 0 I loose. There is also a number of other games tables around the room with people winning or not winning lotto tickets. If I want to win the lotto, what number should I pick?

Also I don't tink there is a fundimental issue with having favour with Allah, Christ and Zeus simultaniously. (so you could actualy win, then get up and go play at another table - although there would be a time cost to that).

Now there is the more detailed argument where you argue that a god who desired you disbelieve in him and oppose his will is equally likely to one that desires that you believe in him and supports his will. But as long as there is any imperfection in the mirror then there is a Pascal’s wager to be had.

What if a philosopher tries Pascal's Mugging on the AI for a joke, and the tiny probabilities of 3^^^^3 lives being at stake, override everything else in the AI's calculations?

Suppose that depends on how he calculates the probability of the threat of the mugger. The very act of giving a specific probability to a threat like that opens one up to an infinite risk (i.e. that they will demand infinite things in exchange for infinity x 3^^^^3 lives). So this is a bit like comparing what I might call naive utilitarianism (where one doesn’t consider the wider effects of one’s acts and rules) with pure utilitarianism (where one takes everything into account).

Whether that neutralizes Pascal’s wager relates to how one resolves the mirror issue I mentioned. If that produces a tidy result then the problem above doesn’t occur.