I just found your post via a search engine. I wanted to quickly follow up on your last paragraph, as I have designed and recently published an equilibrium concept that extends superrationality to non-symmetric games (also non-zero-sum). Counterfactuals are at the core of the reasoning (making it non-Nashian in essence), and outcomes are always unique and Pareto-optimal.
I thought that this might be of interest to you? If so, here are the links:
With colleagues of mine, we also previously published a similar equilibrium concept for games in extensive form (trees). Likewise, it is always unique and Pareto-optimal, but it also always exists. In the extensive form, there is the additional issue of Grandfather's paradoxes and preemption.
Dear Nisan,
I just found your post via a search engine. I wanted to quickly follow up on your last paragraph, as I have designed and recently published an equilibrium concept that extends superrationality to non-symmetric games (also non-zero-sum). Counterfactuals are at the core of the reasoning (making it non-Nashian in essence), and outcomes are always unique and Pareto-optimal.
I thought that this might be of interest to you? If so, here are the links:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0022249620300183
(public version of the accepted manuscript on https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.05723 )
With colleagues of mine, we also previously published a similar equilibrium concept for games in extensive form (trees). Likewise, it is always unique and Pareto-optimal, but it also always exists. In the extensive form, there is the additional issue of Grandfather's paradoxes and preemption.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.6172
And more recently, I found a way to generalize it to any positions in Minkowski spacetime (subsuming all of the above):
https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.04196
Kind regards and have a nice day,
Ghislain