I will not "make friends" with an appliance.
That's really substratist of you.
But in any case, the toaster (working in tandem with the LLM "simulating" the toaster-AI-character) will predict that and persuade you some other way.
Of course, it would first make friends with you, so that you'd feel comfortable leaving up to it the preparation of your breakfast, and you'll even feel happy that you have such a thoughtful friend.
If you were to break the toaster for that, it would predict that and simply do it in a way that would actually work.
Unless you precommit to breaking all your AIs that will do anything differently from what you tell them to, no matter the circumstances and no matter how you feel about it in that moment.
Can you show what priors you used, how you calculated the posteriors, what numbers you got and where the input numbers came from? I highly doubt that hypothesis has a higher posterior probability.
The wifi hacking also immediately struck me as reminiscent of paranoid psychosis.
How hard is it to hack somebody's wifi?
Also, a traumatized person attributing a seemingly hacked wifi to their serious abuser doesn't need to mean any mental illness.
That's irrelevant. To see why one-boxing is important, we need to realize the general principle - that we can only impose a boundary condition on all computations-which-are-us (i.e. we can choose how both us and all perfect predictions of us choose, and both us and all the predictions have to choose the same). We can't impose a boundary condition only on our brain (i.e. we can't only choose how our brain decides while keeping everything else the same). This is necessarily true.
Without seeing this (and therefore knowing we should one-box), or even while being unaware of this principle altogether, there is no point in trying to have a "debate" about it.
What do I get out of any of this?
If Bob asked this question, it would show he's misunderstanding the point of Alice's critique - unless I'm missing something, she claims he should, morally speaking, act differently.
Responding "What do I get out of any of this?" to that kind of critique is either a misunderstanding, or a rejection of morality ("I don't care if I should be, morally speaking, doing something else, because I prefer to maximize my own utility.").
Edit: Or also, possibly, a rejection of Alice ("You are so annoying that I'll pretend this conversation is about something else to make you go away.").
The author shares how terrible it feels that X is true, without bringing arguments for X being true in the first place (based on me skimming the post). That can bypass the reader's fact-check (because why would he write about how bad it made him feel that X is true if it wasn't?).
It feels to me like he's trying to combine an emotional exposition (no facts, talking about his feelings) with an expository blogpost (explaining a topic), while trying to grab the best of both worlds (the persuasiveness and emotions of the former and the social status of the latter) without the substance to back it up.
omnizoid's post as an example of where not to take EY's side was poorly chosen. He two-boxes on Newcomb's problem and any confident statements he makes about rationality or decision theory should be, for that reason, ignored entirely.
Of course, you go meta, without claiming that he's object-level right, but I'm not sure using an obviously wrong post to take his side on the meta level is a good idea.
To understand why FDT is true, it's best to start with Newcomb's problem. Since you believe you should two-box, it might be best to debate the Newcomb's problem with somebody first. Debating FDT at this stage seems like a waste of time for both parties.
(The visual fidelity is a very small fraction of what we actually think it is - the brain lies to us about how much we perceive.)