Summary This is the first piece of a blog post series that explores how AI prediction services affect the risks of war. It is based on my 10-week summer research project at Stanford Existential Risk Institute. In this post, I will discuss different prediction technologies - how they might be...
This is the second piece of a blog post series that explores how AI prediction services affect the risks of war. It is based on my 10-week summer research project at Stanford Existential Risk Institute. See my first post for a summary of my project and my epistemic status. In...
This is the final piece of a blog post series that explores how AI prediction services affect the risks of war. It is based on my 10-week summer research project at Stanford Existential Risk Institute. Here's a summary of my project and my epistemic status. In previous posts, I have...
Thanks for checking! I think our main difference is that you use data from Metaculus prediction whereas I used Metaculus postdiction, which "uses data from all other questions to calibrate its result, even questions that resolved later." Right now, this gives Metaculus an average log score of 0.519 vs. the community's 0.419 (total questions: 885) for binary questions, 2.43 vs. 2.25 for 537 continuous questions, evaluated at resolve time.
This is the first piece of a blog post series that explores how AI prediction services affect the risks of war. It is based on my 10-week summer research project at Stanford Existential Risk Institute.
In this post, I will discuss different prediction technologies - how they might be relevant to nation-state governments and what their development trajectories might look like. The second post borrows from international relations literature to examine what implications follow for the risk of war. The third post concludes with three possible world scenarios and a few final remarks.
This is the second piece of a blog post series that explores how AI prediction services affect the risks of war. It is based on my 10-week summer research project at Stanford Existential Risk Institute. See my first post for a summary of my project and my epistemic status.
In the first post, I have surveyed different prediction technologies, how they might be relevant to nation-state governments, and what their development trajectories might look like. This post applies international relations literature to examine what implications follow for the risk of war. The next post will describe three possible “world order” scenarios after prediction capability takes off.
I choose to focus on the rationalist... (read 2715 more words →)
This is the final piece of a blog post series that explores how AI prediction services affect the risks of war. It is based on my 10-week summer research project at Stanford Existential Risk Institute. Here's a summary of my project and my epistemic status.
In previous posts, I have surveyed different prediction technologies and analyzed what implications follow for the risk of war. In this concluding post, I will describe three possible “world order” scenarios that seem internally consistent. They differ in how prediction capability distributes across nation-states and within nation-states.
In this world, one nation-state government gets the best AI prediction services. With a deeply integrated industrial-military complex, it... (read 951 more words →)
Thanks for the comment and I enjoy reading the article! I basically agree with what you said and admit that I only get to touch a bit upon this important "multi-level interests problem" within the "domestic audience" section. I think it would depend a lot on (1) how diffused those war-relevant prediction services are and (2) the distribution of societal trust in them (e.g. whether they become politicalized), which would be country/context-specific and I did not come up with useful ways to further disentangle them on a general level.