Caledonian, aside from the continental school, could you please give some examples of people trying to posture to be profound? In philosophy graduate programs today, you are explicitly told not to posture.
Also, could you give an example of a philosophical problem that science has solved. E.g., What makes right actions right? What makes a society just? What makes mathematical claims true?
Your polemic is embarrassing. Your post was a form of masturbation.
Suppose God hands a you a 4-d map of the universe that shows all of the events that occur and all of the things that exist. On a common (but by no means only reasonable) interpretation of what lawfulness means, the idea is that if given the laws of nature, the state of affairs in one time slice implies the state of affairs in any other. So, given Ln (laws of nature), if S0 (state of affairs at time slice 0) then S1 (state of affairs at time slice 1). That kind of thing. (Complications: no unique time-slices due to relativity, perhaps some laws of nature might be time-reversal variant, etc.)
However, it's logically possible that the 4-d map doesn't admit of those sorts of laws. It might just be that there is no non-trivial set of rules about the relationship between the state of affairs at one time slice versus another. (Trivial laws will still hold. Imagine a lengthy disjunctive law of nature that simply says something like if S1 then S2, then S3...if S2 then S1 then S3... etc.)
Whether the universe is going to admit of non-trivial rules or not is an empirical thing, not a logical point. It's a good methodological assumption that the universe is lawlike, but it's not logically necessary.
Presumably you think that the statement, "X is a truth only if falsifiable" is true.
Is this statement falsifiable?
It isn't falsifiable on empirical grounds. It might be falsiable on a priori grounds, though I bet that's not what you have in mind. If you admit of a priori grounds, though, you've opened the door back up for ethics despite it not being empirically testable.
One often sees ethicists arguing that all desires are in principle reducible to the desire for happiness? How often? If you're talking about philosopher ethicists, in general you see them arguing against this view.
Based on your comments here, I've increased my subjective probability that you will not write a great philosophy book significantly.
When did Tyler say that overcoming bias is not important? Are you talking about this post here: http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2007/08/how-important-i.html
He says it's not the most important thing in the world, not that it's not important. So, is your reading of Cowen biased? Or did I miss something?