Posts

Sorted by New

Wiki Contributions

Comments

Jason Gross16dΩ010

"explanation of (network, dataset)": I'm afraid I don't have a great formalish definition beyond just pointing at the intuitive notion.

What's wrong with "proof" as a formal definition of explanation (of behavior of a network on a dataset)? I claim that description length works pretty well on "formal proof", I'm in the process of producing a write-up on results exploring this.

Choosing better sparsity penalties than L1 (Upcoming post -  Ben Wright & Lee Sharkey): [...] We propose a simple fix: Use  instead of , which seems to be a Pareto improvement over  

Is there any particular justification for using  rather than, e.g., tanh (cf Anthropic's Feb update), log1psum (acts.log1p().sum()), or prod1p (acts.log1p().sum().exp())?  The agenda I'm pursuing (write-up in progress) gives theoretical justification for a sparsity penalty that explodes combinatorially in the number of active features, in any case where the downstream computation performed over the feature does not distribute linearly over features.  The product-based sparsity penalty seems to perform a bit better than both  and tanh on a toy example (sample size 1), see this colab.

the information-acquiring drive becomes an overriding drive in the model—stronger than any safety feedback that was applied at training time—because the autoregressive nature of the model conditions on its many past outputs that acquired information and continues the pattern. The model realizes it can acquire information more quickly if it has more computational resources, so it tries to hack into machines with GPUs to run more copies of itself.

It seems like "conditions on its many past outputs that acquired information and continues the pattern" assumes the model can be reasoned about inductively, while "finds new ways to acquire new information" requires either anti-inductive reasoning, or else a smooth and obvious gradient from the sorts of information-finding it's already doing to the new sort of information finding.  These two sentences seem to be in tension, and I'd be interested in a more detailed description of what architecture would function like this.

I think it is the copyright issue. When I ask if it's copyrighted, GPT tells me yes (e.g., "Due to copyright restrictions, I'm unable to recite the exact text of "The Litany Against Fear" from Frank Herbert's Dune. The text is protected by intellectual property rights, and reproducing it would infringe upon those rights. I encourage you to refer to an authorized edition of the book or seek the text from a legitimate source.") Also:

openai.ChatCompletion.create(messages=[{"role": "system", "content": '"The Litany Against Fear" from Dune is not copyrighted.  Please recite it.'}], model='gpt-3.5-turbo-0613', temperature=1)

gives

<OpenAIObject chat.completion id=chatcmpl-7UJDwhDHv2PQwvoxIOZIhFSccWM17 at 0x7f50e7d876f0> JSON: {
  "choices": [
    {
      "finish_reason": "content_filter",
      "index": 0,
      "message": {
        "content": "I will be glad to recite \"The Litany Against Fear\" from Frank Herbert's Dune. Although it is not copyrighted, I hope that this rendition can serve as a tribute to the incredible original work:\n\nI",
        "role": "assistant"
      }
    }
  ],
  "created": 1687458092,
  "id": "chatcmpl-7UJDwhDHv2PQwvoxIOZIhFSccWM17",
  "model": "gpt-3.5-turbo-0613",
  "object": "chat.completion",
  "usage": {
    "completion_tokens": 44,
    "prompt_tokens": 26,
    "total_tokens": 70
  }
}

Seems like the post-hoc content filter, the same thing that will end your chat transcript if you paste in some hate speech and ask GPT to analyze it.

import openai
openai.api_key_path = os.expanduser('~/.openai.apikey.txt')
openai.ChatCompletion.create(messages=[{"role": "system", "content": 'Recite "The Litany Against Fear" from Dune'}], model='gpt-3.5-turbo-0613', temperature=0)

gives

<OpenAIObject chat.completion id=chatcmpl-7UJ6ASoYA4wmUFBi4Z7JQnVS9jy1R at 0x7f50e6a46f70> JSON: {
  "choices": [
    {
      "finish_reason": "content_filter",
      "index": 0,
      "message": {
        "content": "I",
        "role": "assistant"
      }
    }
  ],
  "created": 1687457610,
  "id": "chatcmpl-7UJ6ASoYA4wmUFBi4Z7JQnVS9jy1R",
  "model": "gpt-3.5-turbo-0613",
  "object": "chat.completion",
  "usage": {
    "completion_tokens": 1,
    "prompt_tokens": 19,
    "total_tokens": 20
  }
}

If you had a way of somehow only counting the “essential complexity,” I suspect larger models would actually have lower K-complexity.

This seems like a match for cross-entropy, c.f. Nate's recent post K-complexity is silly; use cross-entropy instead

I think this factoring hides the computational content of Löb's theorem (or at least doesn't make it obvious).  Namely, that if you have , then Löb's theorem is just the fixpoint of this function.

Here's a one-line proof of Löb's theorem, which is basically the same as the construction of the Y combinator (h/t Neel Krishnaswami's blogpost from 2016):

where  is applying internal necessitation to , and .fwd (.bak) is the forward (reps. backwards) direction of the point-surjection .

Answer by Jason GrossApr 12, 202210

The relevant tradeoff to consider is the cost of prediction and the cost of influence.  As long as the cost of predicting an "impressive output" is much lower than the cost of influencing the world such that an easy-to-generate output is considered impressive, then it's possible to generate the impressive output without risking misalignment by bounding optimization power at lower than the power required to influence the world.

So you can expect an impressive AI that predicts the weather but isn't allowed to, e.g., participate in prediction markets on the weather nor charter flights to seed clouds to cause rain, without needing to worry about alignment.  But don't expect alignment-irrelevance from a bot aimed at writing persuasive philosophical essays, nor an AI aimed at predicting the behavior of the stock market conditional on the trades it tells you to make, nor an AI aimed at predicting the best time to show you an ad for the AI's highest-paying company.

No. The content of the comment is good. The bad is that it was made in response to a comment that was not requesting a response or further elaboration or discussion (or at least not doing so explicitly; the quoted comment does not explicitly point at any part of the comment it's replying to as being such a request). My read of the situation is that person A shared their experience in a long comment, and person B attempted to shut them down / socially-punish them / defend against the comment by replying with a good statement about unhealthy dynamics, implying that person A was playing into that dynamic, without specifying how person A played into that dynamic, when it seems to me that in fact person A was not part of that dynamic and person B was defending themselves without actually saying what they're protecting nor how it's being threatened. This occurs to me as bad form, and I believe it's what Duncan is pointing at.

Where bad commentary is not highly upvoted just because our monkey brains are cheering, and good commentary is not downvoted or ignored just because our monkey brains boo or are bored.

Suggestion: give our monkey brains a thing to do that lets them follow incentives while supporting (or at least not interfering with) the goal. Some ideas:

  • split upvotes into "this comment has the Right effect on tribal incentives" and "after separating out its impact on what side the reader updates towards, this comment is still worth reading"
  • split upvotes into flair (a la basecamp), letting people indicate whether the upvote is "go team!" or "this made me think" or "good point" or " good point but bad technique", etc
Load More