THE TEMPORAL PARADOX OF DIVINE OMNISCIENCE AND OMNIPOTENCE

Jazz Maurizzi

ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a novel paradox challenging the coexistence of perfect omniscience and perfect omnipotence within a temporal framework. It argues that absolute foreknowledge of future events logically conflicts with the capacity for absolute freedom to change those events. Through a structured logical analysis, it demonstrates that divine perfection as traditionally conceived may involve internal contradiction. Anticipated objections are addressed, with the broader implication that certain classical theological models may require re-examination.

INTRODUCTION
The attributes of omniscience and omnipotence have been fundamental to theological conceptions of God across millennia. Classical thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas, and Kierkegaard explored these attributes, often emphasizing their harmony. However, a critical question arises when considering these attributes in the context of temporality: Can a being know the future with absolute certainty while also possessing the genuine power to change it? This paper formulates and defends a paradox — conceived independently by the author — that suggests the traditional synthesis of omniscience and omnipotence is internally incoherent when applied to the dimension of time.

FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE PARADOX
If God knows the future in absolute terms (omniscience), then the future is necessarily fixed. If God can change the future freely (omnipotence), then the future is not fixed. Thus, the attributes of perfect omniscience and perfect omnipotence cannot coexist coherently in relation to time.

LOGICAL STRUCTURE
The logical structure of the paradox centres around the fundamental incompatibility between divine omniscience and omnipotence, particularly when framed within the context of time.

Premise 1: Omniscience entails knowledge of all true propositions, including propositions about future events.
Omniscience, by definition, means a being knows all truths. If God is omniscient, He knows all propositions, past, present, and future, and this knowledge is infallible. Future events, by their very nature, are unknowable unless they are already predetermined. In classical theism, God's knowledge of the future is not contingent on time but is seen as perfect and unchanging.

Premise 2: Omnipotence entails the ability to bring about or pre...

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