A lot of this reminds me about an old econ article I read in school. Ron Heiner's The Origins of Predictable Behavior. As I recall, the basic argument is baysean in reasoning and largely gets to how social rules evolve to deal with very infrequent but highly costly, socially I want to say but also individually, actions by members of society.
The infrequency and lack of firsthand knowledge creates a lot of tensions in terms of views about the existing rules. Broadly that can fit into the view of resistance to change and "sky is falling" type fears and rhetoric that does generally slow the rate of change.
I'd be much happier with a post with the target I think you're aiming at if there was some comparisons to as many other pandemic events as possible.
To be honest I don't find the bit about global GDP loss or the lack of follow through with some planned program funding that convincing or even relevant. Most of the programs announced in 2022 were likely all suggested in 2020 or 2021 so likely more knee-jerk "we have to show the people we're doing something" rather than well thought out. Then in 2022 and 2023 you have politics starting to dominate and since they are competing with other spending needs may well have been poor options for spending (compared to preventing future pandemics or other programs that also have some greater discounted value to social welfare and overall health). So not clear that we should take each or even any of them as good ideas we should have implemented.
Similarly, looking at global GDP from the World Bank data it's not clear that the hit to GDB was as bad as claimed. Sure, 82T is a big number. So is 17T but over 5 years in the context of global GDP not so shocking. I think that was a case of seeing something big in isolation and so thinking it's a bigger issue and it real is. Also, MR had a post about the impact to income in the USA and the government response. The estimate was the the lock-down reduces incomes by $15B a month. But the government support in response was something like $30B a month. A bit hard to see that situation supporting a big hit to GDP/incomes. I would agree that the USA situation is not representative of the world, but not too different from other developed countries (which I would include China in) and those are the countries that drive global GDP. The chart on the World Bank site supports the supply shock to GDP for 2020 but then basically a return to the prior growth path, or even a steeper one. So I don't actually see that it's an easy case to make that we had some significant, persistent negative impact to global GDP. As such, I'm not seeing how this might support any claims about human's not having learned anything from the pandemic.
Feel like I should add one quick point as well. I think it's a mistake to make the type of aggregate claim "humanity learned almost nothing". That is either a claim that no one learned much or just wrong. as such I think framing the question that way is likely to lead one into a sub optimal analytic framework and so reduce whatever value such an inquire might produce.
While not quite buying votes elections in the Philippines, at least local elections, have near ubiquitous payments to potential voters by candidate -- including forms with the name of the recipient (eligible voter) for each in a household (seems to help ensure that someone doesn't front-run the payment and keep all payments when they can only cast one vote).
But when talking with people about the whole arrangement no one seems to think it actually changes results or makes anything better in terms or official or policy or effective governance. Just a small bit of extra cash candidates have to payout -- and so will then want to recoup in terms of bribes or other forms of political corruption.
Not something I've made a study about so all anecdotal but seems to be a real world case that is similar to your thoughts. But also different in that each candidate is making a payment and no real enforcement mechanism to ensure the vote is given to the highest bidder (or whatever the buy structure might be).
I don't think selling or buying votes is a good solution. There is a reason why we have multiple forms of social institutions: they solve different types of problems using different types of tools. If you think the problems of governance and policy are solved via a market mechanism I think your first task is to show why the market solution never emerged in the first place. But I think if you want to go down that path why stop at votes, why not take David Friedman's approach of a market anarchy where government largely doesn't exist but private solutions provided in a competitive market setting do.
First, I'll admit, after rereading, a poor/uncharitable first read of your position. Sorry for that.
But I would still suggest your complaint is about some economist rather than economics as a study or analysis tool For example, "If anything, the value of labor goes UP, not down, with population! E.g. dense cities are engines of growth!" fits very well into economics of network effects.
To the extent that the economists can only consider AI as capital that's a flawed view, I would agree. I would suggest it is, for economic application, probably best equated with "human capital" -- which is also something different than labor or capital in classic capital-labor dichotomy.
So, in the end I still see the main complaint you have is not really about economics but perhaps your experience is that economists (that you talk with) might be more prone to this blind spot/bias than others (not sure who that population might be). I don't see that you've really made the case that it was the study of economics that produced this situation. Which them suggests that we don't really have a good pointer to how to get less wrong on this front.
I thought the first two claims were a bit off so didn't read much farther.
The first seems a really poor understanding and hardly steelmanning the economic arguments/views. I'd suggest looking in to the concept of human capital. While economics uses the two broad classes you seem to be locking the terms into a mostly Marxist view (but even Marx didn't view labor a just motive force). Might also be worth noting that the concepts of land, labor and capital are from classical political economy relating to how surplus (the additional "more" the system produces from the inputs) is divided up.
I think for second bit, the Experience Curves claims are a bit poorly thought out I would suggest looking into Say's Law about production and exchange situations. Your shift in demand has to come from somewhere and not just be something that materialized out of thin air. You might look at prior savings but I think that makes a special case type argument rather than a general one. If one sees value in Say's Law, then the increased demand for some product/service comes from the increased production of other goods and services. In that case then resources have already been bid over to those markets (and presumably we might assume are in some semi-stable equilibrium state) so just where are the resources for the shift in supply you suggest?
I would agree that partial/limited understanding of economics (all the econ 101 stuff) will provide pretty poor analysis. I would actually go farther in saying even solid and well informed economics models will only go so far: economics can explain the economic aspects of AI and AI risks but not everything AI or AI risk. I kind of feel perhaps this is where your post is coming from -- thinking simple econ 101 is used to explain AI and finding that lacking.
I'm not sure I agree with cousin_it's premise but lack any good knowledge to justify a strong disagreement. However, I would note that the 300 Spartans story might be read both ways, and perhaps at the same time. If 300 Spartans can fight off the entire Persian army seems to also suggest they are incredibly strong fighters with strong strategy and tactics.
I think one can make both cases and neither necessarily refutes the other.
Seems like this Underdog bias might be connected or interact with persecution complexes.
Re the dumb thought. I've forgotten the author, but as a teenager I was a big SciFi fan (still am actually) and read a short story with exactly this theme. Basically it was the recognition that at some point quantity >= quality. I want to say (have not fact checked myself though) that this was pretty much the USSR's approach to fighting Germany in WWII -- crappy tanks but lots of them.
(Side note, I think for whatever reason, too long a peacetime, more interest in profit than protection, the USA particularly seems to have forgotten that the stuff you use to wage a war are largely all consumables. The non consumable is the industrial base. Clearly there is a minimum cost of producing something that can do the job but much more than that is sub optimal. I am somewhat over simplifying but this also seems to be a fair characterization of where the USA-China naval relationship might be.)
Back to ICBMs, Foreign Affairs had a piece about AI's potential impact on nuclear deterrence in general but did mention the fixed location of ICBM silos as a problem (long known and why everyone has mobile platforms). They might be considered a prime target for a first strike but the reality is they are easily monitored so the mobile platforms are the big deterrents and probably more interesting problem to solve in terms of obsoleting. But perhaps the ICBM platforms, fixed or mobile, shift to a different type role. Pure kinetic (I believe Russia did that with one of the ballistic warheads with pretty devastating results in Ukraine about a year ago) or rather than all the MIRV decoys for the armed MIRV decoys and other function for other delivery vehicles. I suspect the intercept problem with a nuclear warhead is a bit different from that of just a big mass of something dense.
So maybe perhaps obsolescence in their current function but not for some repurposed role.
Other than policing the EU buildings and facilities, does that force do other things? Does it function as some supra police force that investigates throughout the EU?