> If the AI actually ends up with strong evidence for a scenario it assigned super-exponential improbability, the AI reconsiders its priors and the apparent strength of evidence rather than executing a blind Bayesian update, though this part is formally a tad underspecified.
I would love to have a ...(read more)
Ah, I see that I misread. Somehow I had it in my head that you were talking about the question on the philpapers survey specifically about scientific realism. Probably because I've been teaching the realism debate in my philosophy of science course the last couple of weeks.
I am, however, going to ...(read more)
We do pretty well, actually (pdf). (Though I think this is a selection effect, not a positive effect of training.)
I'm guessing that you don't really know what anti-realism in philosophy of science looks like. I suspect that most of the non-specialist philosophers who responded *also* don't really know what the issues are, so this is hardly a knock against you. Scientific realism *sounds* like it should be right...(read more)
Are the meetings word of mouth at this point, then? When is the next meeting planned?
I have had some interest, but I never managed to attend any of the previous meetups. I don't know if I will find time for it in the future.
That question raises a bunch of interpretive difficulties. You will find the expression *sine qua non*, which literally means "without which not," in some medieval writings about causation. For example, Aquinas rejects *mere* sine qua non causality as an adequate account of how the sacraments effect...(read more)
> I'll say it again: there is no point in criticising philosophy unless you have (1) a *better* way of (2) answering the *same* questions.
Criticism could come in the form of showing that the questions shouldn't be asked for one reason or another. Or criticism could come in the form of showing that...(read more)
That is being generous to Hume, I think. The counterfactual account in Hume is an afterthought to the first of his two (incompatible) definitions of causation in the *Enquiry*:
> Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, w...(read more)