The Denes-Raj/Epstein study makes me wonder whether the subjects would still have picked the jar with 100 beans (7 red) if, say, the other jar had been announced to contain 6 beans (5 red) . Is there any “tipping point” (any specific number or percentage of red beans versus other beans) at which the subjects finally choose to follow the probabilities instead of going with “more reds”? What if the other jar had been stated to contain only 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 bean — but with ALL beans in that jar stated to be red? Would some subjects still go for the jar with
A real-world instance of Moore’s Paradox (“It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is”) occurs several times annually at Autzen Stadium in Eugene, Oregon —
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autzen_Stadium
Since 1990, Don Essig, the stadium's PA announcer since 1968, has declared that "It never rains at Autzen Stadium" before each home game as the crowd chants along in unison. He often prefaces it with the local weather forecast, which quite often includes some chance of showers, but reminds fans that "we know the real forecast..." or "let's tell our f