Thank you so much, this is exactly what I was looking for. It's reassuring to know I'm not crazy and other people have thought of this before.
I think you're misunderstanding something, but I can't quite pin down what it is. For clarity, here is my analysis of the events in the thought experiment in chronological order:
1. Omega decides to host a Newcomb's problem, and chooses an agent (Agent A) to participate in it.
2. Omega scans Agent A and simulates their consciousness (call the simulation Agent B), placing it in a "fake" Newcomb's problem situation (e.g. Omega has made no prediction about Agent B, but says that it has in the simulation in order to get a result)
3. Agent B makes its decision, and Omega makes its prediction based on that
4. Omega shows itself to Agent A and initiates... (read more)
Yes, perhaps that sentence wasn't the best way to convey my point. This version of CDT does not in any way acknowledge backward-causality or subjunctive dependence; the idea is that since the predictor runs a simulation of the agent before deciding on its prediction, there is a forward causal influence on the predictor's action in the case that the agent is a simulation.
Disclaimer: I am a math student new to LW and the rationalist community. I could not find this idea anywhere else after a modest amount of research; I apologize if this has been brought up before.
Summary: CDT agents may behave differently than expected in situations involving reliable predictors due to the possibility that they are themselves simulations being run by the predictor. This may lead to decisions such as one-boxing in Newcomb's problem and acquiescing in counterfactual mugging.
The traditionally held conclusion of CDT in Newcomb's problem is that the decision of which boxes to take cannot causally influence the predictor's prediction, so in the absence of any evidence as to what the... (read 597 more words →)
This part is kind of similar to what you're asking?