#1 and #2 can both be combined into the same prescription: don't learn new things if their knowledge doesn't improve your life satisfaction in some way. This is basically a tautology, and if you're a rationalist it's restating the habit of making beliefs pay rent in anticipated experiences, since that's their only utility.
#3 I think is hitting on something, and I think it's that we should be broadly skeptical of arguments put forth by people or organizations genuinely capable of manipulating us.
What does it mean to "wait" for infinite universes? Do you think the universe big bounces over and over again? Are you using "infinity" as a shorthand for "really long time"? Won't the heat death of the universe happen before atoms somewhere spontaneously rearrange themselves into a structure like my brain?
Yes. My definition of "imposter syndrome" is not "imposters". It is an independent and diagnostically valuable delusion in which someone, despite good evidence via their achievements, believes they are incompetent frauds. My thesis is that people who truly underestimate themselves are rare and that imposter syndrome as defined here is not really a prevalent delusion, but a meme propagated because it is psychologically comforting.
Identity thieves do not suffer from imposter syndrome because their self-perception is correct and is not part of a wider pattern of inconsistent reasoning.
[I reply multiple times to comments with multiple independent critiques of my post]
>and it’s because we have a lot of our self-image riding on it, not because we’re chronically depressed.
This whole piece is about how people are wrong. Are people usually right about knowing they're not depressed? (People around them? Their coworkers?)
Depression was the wrong word. My coworkers may be depressed and I don't quite know if I'd notice. But if depression were the reason they doubted themselves endlessly, there'd be no reason to invent "imposter syndrome" except to describe a symptom of depression.
Although, as someone who was hospitalized because of depression, most of the people who have described themselves as former (or current) imposter syndrome suffers did not seem to be depressed before self-diagnosis.
If you are a con man/identity thief/etc., then you are an impostor, and probably have impostor syndrome. Otherwise, you can't be an impostor.
Imposter syndrome is supposed to be a *delusion*. If you are actively impersonating someone, thinking you are doing that is not imposter syndrome.
This might be a bit of a hardball question for an event post, but I've always worried that memory was a zero sum game, and that by using a memorization tool like this I am artificially pushing out information my brain was saving based on its utility. I have the same worry about reading C.S. or math books that I often don't end up using immediately in my work. Is there any evidence you've seen that could address this?