Liam Donovan

Wiki Contributions


It seems like something has to be going wrong if the model output has higher odds that TAI is already here (~12%) than TAI being developed between now and 2027 (~11%)? Relatedly, I'm confused by the disclaimer that "we are not updating on the fact that TAI has obviously not yet arrived" -- shouldn't that fact be baked into the distributions for each parameter (particularly the number of FLOPs to reach TAI)?

Minor curiosity: What was the context behind Asimov predicting in 1990 that permanent space cities would be built within 10 years? It seems like a much wilder leap than any of his other predictions.

Would be very curious to hear thoughts from the people that voted "disagree" on this post

Maybe you could measure how effectively people pass e.g. a multiple choice version of an Intellectual Turing Test (on how well they can emulate the viewpoint of people concerned by AI safety) after hearing the proposed explanations. 

[Edit: To be explicit, this would help further John's goals (as I understand them) because it ideally tests whether the AI safety viewpoint is being communicated in such a way that people can understand and operate the underlying mental models. This is better than testing how persuasive the arguments are because it's a) more in line with general principles of epistemic virtue and b) is more likely to persuade people iff the specific mental models underlying AI safety concern are correct.

 One potential issue would be people bouncing off the arguments early and never getting around to building their own mental models, so maybe you could test for succinct/high-level arguments that successfully persuade target audiences to take a deeper dive into the specifics? That seems like a much less concerning persuasion target to optimize, since the worst case is people being wrongly persuaded to "waste" time thinking about the same stuff the LW community has been spending a ton of time thinking about for the last ~20 years]

I strongly prefer the "dying with dignity" mentality for 3 basic reasons:

  • as other people have mentioned, "playing to your outs" is too easy to misinterpret as conditioning on comfortable improbabilities no matter how much you try to draw the distinctions
  • relatedly, focusing on "playing to your outs" (especially if you do so for emotional reasons) may make it harder to stay grounded in accurate models of reality (that may mostly output "we will die soon")
  • Operating under the mindset that death is likely when AGI is still some ways around the corner and easy to ignore seems like it ought to make it easier to stay emotionally resilient and ready to exploit miracle opportunities if/when AGI is looming and impossible to ignore

Of these, the 3rd feels the most important to me, partly because I've seen it discussed least. It seems like if Eliezer's basic model is right, a significant portion of the good outcomes require some kind of miracle occuring at crunch time, which will presumably be easier to obtain if key players are emotionally prepared and not suddenly freaking out for the first time (on an emotional/subconscious level). I know basically nothing about psychology, but isn't it a bad sign if you retreat to "oh death with dignity is unmotivating, let's just focus on our outs" when AGI is less salient?

Wait why are your predictions for Brazil so far from the market? As of right now, there are 180,000 shares of Bolsonaro on the orderbook under 50c on FTX (avg price of 44c if you buy them all).

Yeah it's definitely against poly's terms of service but not against US law (otherwise they wouldn't be complying with the prohibition on offering their services to US customers)

FWIW it is totally legal for Americans to trade on polymarket via a VPN or similar; it's just not legal for polymarket itself to offer services to people with US IP addresses

Is there currently a supply shortage of vaccines? 

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