Linda Linsefors

Hi, I am a Physicist, an Effective Altruist and AI Safety student/rehearser.

Comments

On Destroying the World

I think it's great that you did this. It made the game more real, and hopefully the rest of us learned something.

Honoring Petrov Day on LessWrong, in 2020

I know that it is designed to guide decisions made in the real world. This does not force me to agree with the conclusions in all circumstances. Lots of models are not up to the task they are designed to deal with. 

But I should have said "not in that game theory situation", becasue there is probably a way to construct some game theory game that applies here. That was my bad.

However, I stand by the claim that the full information game is too far from reality to be a good guide in this case. With stakes this high even small uncertainty becomes important.

Honoring Petrov Day on LessWrong, in 2020

What possible reason could Petrov or those in similar situations have had for not pushing the button? Maybe he believed that the US would retaliate and kill his family at home, and that deterred him. In other words, he believed his enemy would push the button.

Or maybe he just did not want to kill millions of people?

Honoring Petrov Day on LessWrong, in 2020

I should probably have said "we are not in that game theory situation". 
(Though I do think that the real world is more complex that current game theory can handle. E.g. I don't think current game theory can fully handle unknown-unknown, but I could be wrong on this point)

The game of mutually assured destruction is very different even when just including known unknown.

Honoring Petrov Day on LessWrong, in 2020

But we are not in a game theory situation. We are in an imperfect world with imperfect information. There are malfunctioning warning systems and liars. And we are humans and not programs that get to read each others source code. There are no perfect commitments and if there where, there would be no way of verifying them.

So I think that the lesson is, that what ever your public stance, and whether or not you think that there are counterfactual situation where you should nuke. In practice, you should not nuke.

Do you see what I'm getting at?

Honoring Petrov Day on LessWrong, in 2020

From this we learn that you should not launch nukes, even if someone tells you to do it.  

Online LessWrong Community Weekend

Applications are now closed. We'll be ~120 participants!

Me and the Helpers are finishing up the final preparations in Discord, and other places, so that we are ready to invite you in on Monday.

I've just sent out the last acceptance emails. If you have applied and not heard from me or anyone else on the organising team, then let me know asap, so we can find out what went wrong.

I may accept late applications in exchange for a bribe. (I'm actually serious about this. A *few* late applications is not a problem, and the bribe is so that you don't make a habit of it.)

Online LessWrong Community Weekend, September 11th-13th

Applications are now closed. We'll be ~120 participants!

Me and the Helpers are finishing up the final preparations in Discord, and other places, so that we are ready to invite you in on Monday.

I've just sent out the last acceptance emails. If you have applied and not heard from me or anyone else on the organising team, then let me know asap, so we can find out what went wrong.

I may accept late applications in exchange for a bribe. (I'm actually serious about this. A *few* late applications is not a problem, and the bribe is so that you don't make a habit of it.)

Online LessWrong Community Weekend

Good point. I also got this question elsewhere.

Sofia Gallego suggests:

If your country allows it, there are plenty of platforms (e.g. TransferWise) with which you can do international transfers easier and with lower fees than banks.

If that don't work, you can also send money to me on paypal, with a message what it is for, and I'll transfer it to LessWrong Deutschland for you. Bank transfer with in Europe is super easy.

linda.linsefors@gmail.com

The Curse Of The Counterfactual
he admits that she did not actually do any of the things she thinks she should have. But her brain persists in arguing that reality is wrong.

This is interesting. We use the word "should" both as to command ourselves and others. "You should eat vegetables", and to make predictions "This should work". Both types has a similar type of uncertainty, we do not know if the suggestion will be obeyed or if our prediction will be right.

I'm not sure how much one should read in to linguistic quirks like this.

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