I'm sorry to comment on such an old post, but I'm really new to rationality and especially bayesianism, and this discussion got me confused about something.
Non-reductionists such as Richard say there is a non-physical "thingy" called a consciousness, and that it is epiphenomenal. That means it has no consequences on the physical world.
Wouldn't this be a model that doesn't anticipate anything, as you described in your first posts? If one argues that conciousness has no effect on the observable world, isn't one arguing that there might not be any conciousness at all? That the whole argument is pointless?
I'm sorry to comment on such an old post, but I'm really new to rationality and especially bayesianism, and this discussion got me confused about something.
Non-reductionists such as Richard say there is a non-physical "thingy" called a consciousness, and that it is epiphenomenal. That means it has no consequences on the physical world.
Wouldn't this be a model that doesn't anticipate anything, as you described in your first posts? If one argues that conciousness has no effect on the observable world, isn't one arguing that there might not be any conciousness at all? That the whole argument is pointless?