If I understand the wall argument, I don't even think you need the wall at all. Since all the information, and all the steps in the calculation, are encoded in how you choose to map the electrons to the elements of the Turing machine, the electrons are superfluous. A region of space could be gerrymandered in the same way. This is reminiscent of the "dust theory" from Greg Egan's Permutation City. But it's fanciful. In reality, computation involves mechanical cause and effect. I would need more convincing to believe that it is completely arbitrary. Certainl... (read more)
The process of copying a number into a register and then adding 1 to it must happen a lot. If you watch that, step by step, it really looks for all the world like adding 1 to a binary number. Even if you aren't familiar with binary numbers, you might figure the concept from watching this happen a few times. And it quickly disambiguates endianness.
I am not sure what to make of this distinction because, while I feel more sympathetic to most of the conclusions drawn by Camp 1, I have trouble with the notion that "apparently perceived experiences" can be "wrong". If it seems to me like I am feeling what it feels like to have a headache, then surely I can be certain that I am having the experience of having it seem like I have a headache? And can't I just collapse that to having the experience of having a headache? If I try to explain what I mean in any greater detail, I find myself turning to Camp 1-t... (read more)