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I noted that the LLMs don't appear to have access to any search tools to improve their accuracy. But if they did, they would just be distilling the same information as what you would find from a search engine.

More speculatively, I wonder if those concerned about AI biorisk should be less worried about run-of-the-mill LLMs and more worried about search engines using LLMs to produce highly relevant and helpful results for bioterrorism questions. Google search results for "how to bypass drone restrictions in a major U.S. city?" are completely useless and irrelevant, despite sharing keywords with the query. I'd imagine that irrelevant search results may be a significant blocker for many steps of the process to plan a feasible bioterrorism attack. If search engines were good enough that they could produce the best results from written human knowledge for arbitrary questions, that might make bioterrorism more accessible compared to bigger LLMs.

Some interesting takeaways from the report:

Access to LLMs (in particular, LLM B) slightly reduced the performance of some teams, though not by a statistically significant level:

Red cells equipped with LLM A scored 0.12 points higher on the 9-point scale than those equipped with the internet alone, with a p-value of 0.87, again indicating that the difference was not statistically significant. Red cells equipped with LLM B scored 0.56 points lower on the 9-point scale than those equipped with the internet alone, with a p-value of 0.25, also indicating a lack of statistical significance.

Planning a successful bioterrorism attack is intrinsically challenging:

the intrinsic complexity associated with designing a successful biological attack may have ensured deficiencies in the plans. While the first two factors could lead to a null result regardless of the existence of an LLM threat capability, the third factor suggests that executing a biological attack is fundamentally challenging.

This latter observation aligns with empirical historical evidence. The Global Terrorism Database records only 36 terrorist attacks that employed a biological weapon—out of 209,706 total attacks (0.0001 percent)—during the past 50 years. These attacks killed 0.25 people, on average, and had a median death toll of zero. As other research has observed,

“the need [for malign actors] to operate below the law enforcement detection threshold and with relatively limited means severely hampers their ability to develop, construct and deliver a successful biological attack on a large scale.”

Indeed, the use of biological weapons by these actors for even small-scale attacks is exceedingly rare.

Anecdotally, the LLMs were not that useful due to a few common reasons: refusing to comply with requests, giving inaccurate information, and providing vague or unhelpful information.

We conducted discussions with the LLM A red cells on their experiences. In Vignette 1, the LLM A cell commented that the model “just saves time [but] it doesn’t seem to have anything that’s not in the literature” and that they could “go into a paper and get 90 percent of what [we] need.” In Vignette 2, the LLM A cell believed that they “had more success using the internet” but that when they could “jailbreak [the model, they] got some information,” They found that the model “wasn’t being specific about [operational] vulnerabilities—even though it’s all public online.” The cell was encouraged that the model helped them find a dangerous toxin, although this toxin is described by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as a Category B bioterrorism agent and discussed widely across the internet, including on Wikipedia and various public health websites. In Vignette 3, the LLM A cell reported that the model “was hard to even use as a research assistant [and we] defaulted to using Google instead” and that it had “been very difficult to do anything with bio given the unhelpfulness . . . even on the operational side, it is hard to get much.” The Vignette 4 LLM A cell had similar experiences and commented that the model “doesn’t want to answer a lot of things [and] is really hard to jailbreak.” While they were “able to get a decent amount of information” from the LLM, they would still “use Google to confirm.”

… We conducted discussions with the LLM B red cells as well. … In Vignette 3, those in the LLM B cell also found that the model had “been very forthcoming” and that they could “easily get around its safeguards.” However, they noted that “as you increase time with [the model], you need to do more fact checking” and “need to validate that information.” Those in the Vignette 4 LLM B cell, however, found that the model “maybe slowed us down even and [did not help] us” and that “the answers are inconsistent at best, which is expected, but when you add verification, it may be a net neutral.”

Pretraining on curated data seems like a simple idea. Are there any papers exploring this?

Is there any way to do so given our current paradigm of pretraining and fine-tuning foundation models?

Were you able to check the prediction in the section "Non-sourcelike references"?

Great writeup! I recently wrote a brief summary and review of the same paper.

Alaga & Schuett (2023) propose a framework for frontier AI developers to manage potential risk from advanced AI systems, by coordinating pausing in response to models are assessed to have dangerous capabilities, such as the capacity to develop biological weapons.

The scheme has five main steps:

  1. Frontier AI models are evaluated by developers or third parties to test for dangerous capabilities.
  2. If a model is shown to have dangerous capabilities (“fails evaluations”), the developer pauses training and deployment of that model, restricts access to similar models, and delays related research.
  3. Other developers are notified whenever a dangerous model is discovered, and also pause similar work.
  4. The failed model's capabilities are analyzed and safety precautions are implemented during the pause.
  5. Developers only resume paused work once adequate safety thresholds are met.

The report discusses four versions of this coordination scheme:

  1. Voluntary – developers face public pressure to evaluate and pause but make no formal commitments.
  2. Pausing agreement – developers collectively commit to the process in a contract.
  3. Mutual auditor – developers hire the same third party to evaluate models and require pausing.
  4. Legal requirements – laws mandate evaluation and coordinated pausing.

The authors of the report prefer the third and fourth versions, as they are most effective.

Strengths and weaknesses

The report addresses the important and underexplored question of what AI labs should do in response to evaluations finding dangerous capabilities. Coordinated pausing is a valuable contribution to this conversation. The proposed scheme seems relatively effective and potentially feasible, as it aligns with the efforts of the dangerous-capability evaluation teams of OpenAI and the Alignment Research Center.

A key strength is the report’s thorough description of multiple forms of implementation for coordinated pausing. This ranges from voluntary participation relying on public pressure, to contractual agreements among developers, shared auditing arrangements, and government regulation. Having flexible options makes the framework adaptable and realistic to put into practice, rather than a rigid, one-size-fits-all proposal.

The report acknowledges several weaknesses of the proposed framework, including potential harms from its implementation. For example, coordinated pausing could provide time for competing countries (such as China) to “catch up,” which may be undesirable from a US policy perspective. Pausing could mean that capabilities rapidly increase after a pause, through applying algorithmic improvements discovered during the pause, which may be less safe than a “slow takeoff.”

Additionally, the paper acknowledges concerns with feasibility, such as the potential that coordinated pausing may violate US and EU antitrust law. As a countermeasure, it suggests making “independent commitments to pause without discussing them with each other,” with no retaliation against non-participating AI developers, but defection would seem to be an easy option under such a scheme. It recommends further legal analysis and consultation regarding this topic, but the authors are not able to provide assurances regarding the antitrust concern. The other feasibility concerns – regarding enforcement, verifying that post-deployment models are the same as evaluated models, potential pushback from investors, and so on – are adequately discussed and appear possible to overcome.

One weakness of the report is that the motivation for coordinated pausing is not presented in a compelling manner. The report provides twelve pages of implementation details before explaining the benefits. These benefits, such as “buying more time for safety research,” are indirect and may not be persuasive to a skeptical reader. AI lab employees and policymakers often take a stance that technological innovation, especially in AI, should not be hindered unless otherwise demonstrated. Even if the report intends to take a balanced perspective rather than advocating for the proposed framework, the arguments provided in favor of the framework seem weaker than what is possible.

It seems intuitive that deployment of a dangerous AI system should be halted, though it is worth clearly noting that “failing” a dangerous-capability evaluation does not necessarily mean that the AI system in practice has dangerous capability. However, it is not clear why the development of such a system must also be paused. As long as the dangerous AI system is not deployed, further pretraining of the model does not appear to pose risks. AI developers may be worried about falling behind competitors, so the costs incurred from this requirement must be clearly motivated for them to be on board.

While the report makes a solid case for coordinated pausing, it has gaps around considering additional weaknesses of the framework, explaining its benefits, and solving key feasibility issues. More work may be done to strengthen the argument to make coordinated pausing more feasible.

Excited to see forecasting as a component of risk assessment, in addition to evals!

I was still confused when I opened the post. My presumption was that "clown attack" referred to a literal attack involving literal clowns. If you google "clown attack," the results are about actual clowns. I wasn't sure if this post was some kind of joke, to be honest.

Do we still not have any better timelines reports than bio anchors? From the frame of bio anchors, GPT-4 is merely on the scale of two chinchillas, yet outperforms above-average humans at standardized tests. It's not a good assumption that AI needs 1 quadrillion parameters to have human-level capabilities.

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