I wasn't aware of these options, thank you.

There's also Byrne Hobart's article Understanding Jane Street (5.5k words), although pitched at an even lower level maybe. He recommends The Laws of Trading as further reading, alongside: 

This interview with Yaron Minsky is a great look at their decision to use Ocaml. If you're interested in more about the mechanics of exchanges and trading, the Hide not Slide Substack is good. As a starting point, here's their writeup on Jane Street. Max Dama on Automated Trading is old, but a very helpful overview of the industry for technical people. If you want to learn Ocaml, Jane Street's Yaron Minsky has coauthored a good book on it.

Your topline answers to the questions you assume xlr8harder cares about more seem similar to Holden Karnofsky's, and I haven't seen his essay on this mentioned so in this thread so I thought it'd be useful to link it here: What counts as death? An unconventional but simple take on personal identity, that dissolves most paradoxes

My philosophy on "what counts as death" is simple, though unconventional, and it seems to resolve most otherwise mind-bending paradoxical thought experiments about personal identity. It is the same basic idea as the one advanced by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons;¹ Parfit also claims it is similar to Buddha's view² (so it's got that going for it).

I haven't been able to find a simple, compact statement of this philosophy, and I think I can lay it out in about a page. So here it is, presented simply and without much in the way of caveats (this is "how things feel to me" rather than "something I'm confident in regardless of others' opinions"):

Constant replacement. In an important sense, I stop existing and am replaced by a new person each moment (second or minute or whatever).

The sense in which it feels like I "continue to exist, as one unified thread through time" is just an illusion, created by the fact that I have memories of my past. The only thing that is truly "me" is this moment; next moment, it will be someone else.

Kinship with past and future selves. My future self is a different person from me, but he has an awful lot in common with me: personality, relationships, ongoing projects, and more. Things like my relationships and projects are most of what give my current moment meaning, so it's very important to me whether my future selves are around to continue them.

So although my future self is a different person, I care about him a lot, for the same sorts of reasons I care about friends and loved ones (and their future selves).³

If I were to "die" in the common-usage (e.g., medical) sense, that would be bad for all those future selves that I care about a lot.⁴

(I do of course refer to past and future Holdens in the first person. When I refer to someone as "me," that means that they are a past or future self, which generally means that they have an awful lot in common with me. But in a deeper philosophical sense, my past and future selves are other people.)

And that's all. I'm constantly being replaced by other Holdens, and I care about the other Holdens, and that's all that's going on.

• I don't care how quickly the cells in my body die and get replaced (if it were once per second, that wouldn't bother me). My self is already getting replaced all the time, and replacing my cells wouldn't add anything to that.
• I don't care about "continuity of consciousness" (if I were constantly losing consciousness while all my cells got replaced, that wouldn't bother me).
• If you vaporized me and created a copy of me somewhere else, that would just be totally fine. I would think of it as teleporting. It'd be chill.
• If you made a bunch of copies of me, I would be all of them in one sense (I care about them a lot, in the same way that I normally care about future selves) and none of them in another sense (just as I am not my future selves).
• If you did something really weird like splitting my brain in half and combining each half with someone else's brain, that would create two people that I care about more than a stranger and less than "Holden an hour from now."

I don't really find any thought experiments on this topic trippy or mind bending. They're all just cases where I get replaced with some other people who have some things in common with me, and that's already happening all the time.

Footnotes

1. For key quotes from Reasons and Persons, see pages 223-224; 251; 279-282; 284-285; 292; 340-341. For explanations of "psychological continuity" and "psychological connectedness" (which Parfit frequently uses in discussing what matters for what counts as death), see page 206.

   "Psychological connectedness" is a fairly general idea that seems consistent with what I say here; "psychological continuity" is a more specific idea that is less important on my view (though also see pages 288-289, where Parfit appears to equivocate on how much, and how, psychological continuity matters). ↩

2. "As Appendix J shows, Buddha would have agreed. The Reductionist View [the view Parfit defends] is not merely part of one cultural tradition. It may be, as I have claimed, the true view about all people at all times." Reasons and Persons page 273. Emphasis in original. ↩
3. There's the additional matter that he's held responsible for my actions, which makes sense if only because my actions are predictive of his actions. ↩
4. I don't personally care all that much about these future selves' getting to "exist," as an end in itself. I care more about the fact that their disappearance would mean the end of the stories, projects, relationships, etc. that I'm in. But you could easily take my view of personal identity while caring a lot intrinsically about whether your future selves get to exist. ↩

This is great, thank you for making it.

So instead, we tell the lawyers to go nuts. Be as biased as possible, and, as long as they're equally skilled and there aren't background factors that favor one position over the other, this ensures that each presented position is equally far from the truth. The jury now has a fair overview of both sides of the case, without a malicious lawyer being able to advantage one over the other.

This reminds me of Peter Watts' classic post about (among others) how science works:

Science doesn’t work despite scientists being asses. Science works, to at least some extent, because scientists are asses. Bickering and backstabbing are essential elements of the process. Haven’t any of these guys ever heard of “peer review”?

There’s this myth in wide circulation: rational, emotionless Vulcans in white coats, plumbing the secrets of the universe, their Scientific Methods unsullied by bias or emotionalism. Most people know it’s a myth, of course; they subscribe to a more nuanced view in which scientists are as petty and vain and human as anyone (and as egotistical as any therapist or financier), people who use scientific methodology to tamp down their human imperfections and manage some approximation of objectivity.

But that’s a myth too. The fact is, we are all humans; and humans come with dogma as standard equipment. We can no more shake off our biases than Liz Cheney could pay a compliment to Barack Obama. The best we can do— the best science can do— is make sure that at least, we get to choose among competing biases.

That’s how science works. It’s not a hippie love-in; it’s rugby. Every time you put out a paper, the guy you pissed off at last year’s Houston conference is gonna be laying in wait. Every time you think you’ve made a breakthrough, that asshole supervisor who told you you needed more data will be standing ready to shoot it down. You want to know how the Human Genome Project finished so far ahead of schedule? Because it was the Human Genome projects, two competing teams locked in bitter rivalry, one led by J. Craig Venter, one by Francis Collins — and from what I hear, those guys did not like each other at all.

This is how it works: you put your model out there in the coliseum, and a bunch of guys in white coats kick the shit out of it. If it’s still alive when the dust clears, your brainchild receives conditional acceptance. It does not get rejected. This time. ...

Science is so powerful that it drags us kicking and screaming towards the truth despite our best efforts to avoid it. And it does that at least partly fueled by our pettiness and our rivalries. Science is alchemy: it turns shit into gold. 

It took me about 5 years. Again, I don't think it's a useful approach if you don't like exercising in the first place; for me 5 years of resistance training has felt less like a weight-loss strategy and more like an excuse to have fun chasing goals and make like-minded friends along the way.

Lots of people believe they can eat more if they just exercise more. Unfortunately our bodies are highly efficient relative to the density of modern food, so “exercising it away” is not a realistic plan.

'Exercising it away' seems misguided given our bodies' energetic efficiency, as you said. What's instead worked for me is raising my basal metabolic rate substantially by adding muscle, which is very energetically expensive, via ~3 resistance training sessions a week. 

Admittedly I don't know of a way to maintain the required muscle mass for this strategy to work long-term without enjoying physical activity, which I seem to enjoy the way most people enjoy good food, which probably makes this useless as general advice.

Thought it would be useful to share this 2017 HN thread. 

The Myths of Creativity by David Burkus has this passage on class 1 vs class 2 disagreement: 

In the 1970s at Xerox PARC, regularly scheduled arguments were routine. The company that gave birth to the personal computer staged formal discussions designed to train their people on how to fight properly over ideas and not egos. PARC held weekly meetings they called "Dealer" (from a popular book of the time titled Beat the Dealer). Before each meeting, one person, known as "the dealer," was selected as the speaker. The speaker would present his idea and then try to defend it against a room of engineers and scientists determined to prove him wrong. Such debates helped improve products under development and sometimes resulted in wholly new ideas for future pursuit. The facilitators of the Dealer meetings were careful to make sure that only intellectual criticism of the merit of an idea received attention and consideration. Those in the audience or at the podium were never allowed to personally criticize their colleagues or bring their colleagues' character or personality into play. 

Bob Taylor, a former manager at PARC, said of their meetings, "If someone tried to push their personality rather than their argument, they'd find that it wouldn't work." Inside these debates, Taylor taught his people the difference between what he called Class 1 disagreements, in which neither party understood the other party's true position, and Class 2 disagreements, in which each side could articulate the other's stance. Class 1 disagreements were always discouraged, but Class 2 disagreements were allowed, as they often resulted in a higher quality of ideas. Taylor's model removed the personal friction from debates and taught individuals to use conflict as a means to find common, often higher, ground. 

Alan Kay responded to the above with 

This is one of those stories that has distorted over time. "Dealer" was a weekly meeting for many purposes, the main one was to provide a vehicle for coordination, planning, communication without having to set up a management structure for brilliant researchers who had some "lone wolves" tendencies.

Part of these meetings were presentations by PARC researchers. However, it was not a gantlet to be run, and it was not to train people to argue in a constructive way (most of the computer researchers at PARC were from ARPA community research centers, and learning how to argue reasonably was already part of that culture).

Visitors from Xerox frequently were horrified by the level of argument and the idea that no personal attacks were allowed had to be explained, along with the idea that the aim was not to win an argument but to illuminate. Almost never did the participants have to be reminded about "Class 1" and "Class 2", etc. The audience was -not- determined to prove the speaker wrong. That is not the way things were done.

which I suppose suggests the answer to this comment's question is "probably not".

re: The Fractal Prince (really the whole Quantum Thief trilogy), I may be biased, but when I first read it I had 2 reactions: (1) this is the most targeted-at-my-ingroup novel I have ever read (2) nobody outside of my ingroup will get the kajillion references flying around, since Hannu Rajaniemi never bothered footnoting / defending any of them (unlike say what Peter Watts did with Blindsight), so people will think he's just making up technobabble when he's not, which means he'll be generally underappreciated despite the effusive praise (which will be of the generic "he's so smart" variety), which made my heart sink. 

But Gwern not only got it (unsurprisingly), he articulated it better than I ever could, so thanks Gwern:

Hannu makes no concessions to the casual reader, as he mainlines straight into his veins the pre-deep-learning 2010-era transhumanist zeitgeist via Silicon Valley—if it was ever discussed in a late-night bull session after a Singularity University conference, it might pop up here. Hannu stuffs the novels with blink-and-you’ll-miss-it ideas on the level of Olaf Stapeldon. A conventional Verne gun is too easy a way of getting to space—how about beating Project Orion by instead using a nuclear space gun (since emulated brains don’t care about high g acceleration)? Or for example, the All-Defector reveals that, since other universes could be rewriting their rules to expand at maximum speed, erasing other universes before they know it, he plans to rewrite our universe’s rule to do so first (ie. he will defect at the multiversal level against all other universes); whereas beginner-level SF like The Three Body Problem would dilate on this for half a book, Hannu’s grand reveal gets all of 2 paragraphs before crashing into the eucatastrophic ending.

For world-building, he drops neologisms left and right, and hard ones at that—few enough American readers will be familiar with the starting premise of “Arsène Lupin in spaaaace!” (probably more are familiar with the anime Lupin The Third these days), but his expectations go far beyond that: the ideal reader of the trilogy is not merely one familiar with the Prisoner’s Dilemma but also with the bizarre zero-determinant PD strategies discovered ~2008, and not just with such basic physics as quantum entanglement or applications like quantum dots, but exotic applications to quantum auctions & game theory (including Prisoner’s Dilemma) & pseudo-telepathy (yes, those are things), and it would definitely be helpful if that reader happened to also be familiar with Eliezer Yudkowsky’s c. 2000s writings on “Coherent Extrapolated Volition”, with a dash of Nikolai Fyodorovich Fyodorov’s Russian Cosmism for seasoning (although only a dash²⁾.

This leads to an irony: I noted while reading Masamune Shirow’s Ghost in the Shell cyberpunk manga that almost everything technical in the GitS manga turned out to be nonsense despite Shirow’s pretensions to in-depth research & meticulous attention to detail; while in QT, most technical things sound like cyberpunk nonsense and Hannu doesn’t insert any editorial notes like Shirow does to defend them, but are actually real and just so arcane you haven’t heard of them.

For example, some readers accuse Hannu of relying on FTL communication via quantum entanglement, which is bad physics; but Hannu does not! If they had read more closely (similar to the standard reader failure to understand the physics of “Story of Your Life”), they would have noticed that at no point is there communication faster-than-light, only coordination faster-than-light—‘spooky action at a distance’. He is instead employing advanced forms of quantum entanglement which enable things like secret auctions or for coordinated strategies of game-playing (quantum coordination, like treating the particle measurements as flipping a coin and one person does the ‘Heads’ strategy and the other person does the ‘Tails’ strategy does not require communication, obviously, but surprisingly, quantum coordination can be superior to all apparently-equivalent communication-free classical strategies). He explains briefly that the zoku use quantum entanglement in these ways, but a reader could easily miss that, given all the other things they are trying to understand and how common ‘quantum woo’ is.⁠^3⁠ 

Rajaniemi confirmed that Gwern "got it" like nobody else did:

As a longtime fan of gwern 's work -- gwern.net is the best rabbit hole on the Internet -- it's a treat to see this incredibly thoughtful (and slightly spoilery) review of the Quantum Thief trilogy. gwern.net/review/book#quantu… Gwern perfectly nails the emotional core of the trilogy and, true to form, spots a number of easter eggs I thought no one would ever find. This may be my favorite review of all time.

I admire Rajaniemi for pulling it off as you said, but I'm somehow not that surprised. He's bright (mathematical physics PhD) and has been working at writing-as-craft for a while:

But talking to him about his rapid career, it’s quickly apparent he’s no stranger to being compared to other sci-fi rising stars, having first seriously begun writing in 2002 while studying his PhD as part of writing group called Writers Bloc – which includes authors Charles Stross and Alan Campbell. “It is, and always has been a place with quite a harsh level of criticism,” he says. “But in a healthy and professional way, of course, so it was a good group of people and environment in which to develop.”

I personally got the Quantum Thief trilogy because I'd been blown away by Stross' Accelerando, wanted more, and saw Stross say of Rajaniemi: "Hard to admit, but I think he’s better at this stuff than I am.  The best first SF novel I’ve read in many years." 

I see. You may be interested in a contrary(?) take from the Welfare Footprint Project's researchers; in their FAQ they write

4. Why don't you use the term 'suffering', instead of 'pain'?

We prefer not to use the term suffering for various reasons. First, our analyses are concerned with “any” negative affective state (including mild ones), whereas the term suffering is often used to denote more severe states that are accompanied by concurrent negative feelings such as the perception of lack of control, fear, anxiety, the impossibility to enjoy pleasant activities or even a threat to one’s sense of self. Additionally, it is not yet possible to determine objectively when an unpleasant state becomes suffering. This is so far a value judgement, which we leave open to users of our estimates. The term ‘pain’ (both physical and psychological), in turn, is associated with negative affective experiences of a wide range of intensities.

They define their terms further here. To be fair, they focus on non-human animal welfare; I suppose your suffering vs joy distinction is more currently actionable in human-focused contexts e.g. CBT interventions.