MotivationalAppeal
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These are the exact three points that I wanted to voice. The fewer steps there are between entering lesswrong and seeing articles, the fewer steps there are between entering lesswrong and participating in discussions. That our landing page is a navigation list and not a a set of recent articles, the way any other group blog website would have, has irked me since the previous skull graphic was introduced.
The International Phonetic Alphabet was originally meant to be used as a natural language writing system (for example, the journal of the International Phonetic Association was originally written in IPA: http://phonetic-blog.blogspot.com/2012/06/100-years-ago.html). Between IPA's theoretical (physiological) grounding, its wide use by linguists, and its near-legibility by untrained English literati, IPA is over-determined as the obvious choice for a reformed orthography, if English were every made to conform phonetically to a standard pronunciation. That said, it's not going to happen, because spelling reform is not urgent to anyone with capital to try it. Like, someone could make a browser extension that would replace words their IPA spellings, so that an online community could familiarize themselves with the new spelling, but no one has made that, or paid for it to be made, and this places a strong upper bound on how much anyone cares about spelling reform.
I have a few recurrent self-actualization fantasies that make use of fanciful abilities and resources. Sometimes the ability is time travel, which made this tweet by Liron Shapira stand out to me:
A time machine is a mechanism that lets you pretend like something far from you is actually near you, with respect to causal distance.
Likewise with your telekinesis and "vanishing into the floor", I propose that daydreams (as recurrent, unproductive consideration of situations involving plans that are, in reality, non-actionable for their use of fanciful skills and resources) commonly serve as agency-superstimuli: imagined successes, relying on expanded abilities (such as those which reduce effort, cost, or uncertainty of achieving some material... (read 498 more words →)
To say that justice matters intrinsically is to say that sometimes, for justice's sake, we should do things that would make people worse off than if justice were not an issue. Or more accurately, there will at least sometimes be policies trading some welfare (or for any other component of utility) for some justice, that are equally as good as policies which do not (according to the enlarged set of concerns containing justice).
This comment is good, but it could be improved by using symmetric terms to describe the two conditions.
Objectified: Others will..
1) give you few freedoms or choices,
2) dominate you, make decisions for you, control you,
3) have uses for you,
4) initiate romance with little confirmation of your participatory consent
5) want/expect you to care about their well being
6) not care about your well being
7) support you with resources / financially
8) value you for your attractiveness, help, concern, (and child raising and housekeeping)
a) rather than for your financial support or decision making / control
9) want you to value them for their financial support and decision making / control
a) rather... (read more)
Jung didn't really play the science game, and Jungians continue not to play the science game, but if we squint a little, we can see that some of his ideas have been vindicated by science.
The term ‘archetype’ is often misunderstood as meaning certain definite mythological images or motifs. ... The archetype is a tendency to form such representations of a motif. ... My critics have incorrectly assumed that I am dealing with "inherited representations"
From Jung's Approaches to the unconscious (1964), quoted in Jones, Mixed Metaphors and Narrative Shifts (2003).
In this narrow sense, Jung's archetypes are uncontroversial: Much reasoning in humans is framed in cognitive science as proceeding by a mechanism... (read 355 more words →)
Sometimes I feel uncomfortable talking to strangers, and will put off scheduling appointments. Today, after a few days of trying to beat myself into getting a haircut at a barber's shop or salon, I decided to cut my own hair instead. I'm very pleased with the results, and I will probably make a habit of cutting my own hair from now on. I know this solution doesn't generalize to other appointments, such as medical examinations, but I'm very glad to have put that one source of distress to rest.
Relevant in winter, when air is dry and noses are frequently blown: Placing petroleum jelly in one's nostrils for moisture, despite being icky, is a superior experience to a nosebleed.
Not learning combat skills as a commitment to avoid conflict is a nice mirror image of Schelling's Xenophon example, where cutting off your ability to retreat is a way to commit yourself to winning a fight.
I love this post! I've been thinking about it a lot. I think it's mostly wrong, but it's been very stimulating. The main problem is that it wobbles between treating agency in the stated sense of "a capacity to act and make choices", and treating it as intelligence, and treating it as personhood. For one thing, a game player whose moves are predictable will seem dumb, but they still have agency in the stated sense.
Let me see if I can sketch out some slightly improved categories. A predictably moving pendulum is non-agentic, and therefore also not in the class of things that we see as stupid or intelligent: we don't use... (read 464 more words →)