Epistemic Status: Still in a brainstorming phase - very open to constructive criticism.
I'll start by clarifying my definition of moral realism. To begin with an example, here is what a moral realist and anti-realist might say on the topic of suffering:
Moral Realist: The suffering of sentient beings is objectively wrong therefore I want to minimize it
Moral Anti-Realist: I want to minimize the suffering of sentient beings
Moral realists have justifiable terminal goals. They reject the notion that is and ought statements can't mix. A moral realist says that some ought statements fall into the is category, and those that don't are invalid.
A moral realist looks outward to their environment to discover what they... (read 777 more words →)
Its worth mentioning that the majority of people are in camp #2. For example, in Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, Frankish notes:
Further, in the 2020 PhillPapers Survey, 998 English-speaking philosophers were asked "Hard problem of consciousness (is there one?): no or yes?" and 62% said yes while only 29% said no.
One other (more anecdotal) observation I have is that this distinction seems to often be at the crux of disagreement between moral realists and anti-realists. If you are in camp #2... (read more)