The pattern described (the best technical people dress poorly and dressing well gets intepreted as evidence you're not one of the serious ones) seems like a case of counter-signalling, not plain signalling. À la Hanson: a costly, legible signal (e.g. dressing well) is what you produce when your underlying quality isn't otherwise verifiable, so it's a mid-status move. Once your quality is otherwise verifiable (your code, achievements, reputation amongst people you care about), the costly signal becomes redundant. Skipping it becomes a higher status move: on... (read more)
The pattern described (the best technical people dress poorly and dressing well gets intepreted as evidence you're not one of the serious ones) seems like a case of counter-signalling, not plain signalling. À la Hanson: a costly, legible signal (e.g. dressing well) is what you produce when your underlying quality isn't otherwise verifiable, so it's a mid-status move. Once your quality is otherwise verifiable (your code, achievements, reputation amongst people you care about), the costly signal becomes redundant. Skipping it becomes a higher status move: on... (read more)