I'm not recommending it (haven't done a cost-benefit analysis) but Anna was considering flying less because of the fume risk, and bringing a gas mask in the carry-on seems less burdensome than refraining from flying.

Could bring a gas mask?

My biggest problem with this proposal is that it restricts AGI projects to a single entity, which I think is pretty far from the status quo. 

It doesn't, though.  The paper talks about OGI-N as well as OGI-1.  In the former version, there are multiple AGI-developing entities.

I think that's an overstatement.  There is still plenty of demand from international investors for U.S. assets, and e.g. yields on U.S. 30-year treasury bonds are not that high by historical standards (although they've been climbing somewhat since their historic lows in 2020.)  If there is a reduction in confidence in other sorts of USG commitments, but maintained confidence in it's basic financial commitments and in U.S. property law, then that might support the paper's contention that the latter kind form a comparatively more reliable basis for positive-sum deals in relation to AGI-development than other types of agreements.

"I think your life expectancy and that of your loved ones (at least from a mundane perspective) is longer if AGI is developed than if it isn't."

You must have extreme confidence about this, or else your attitude about AGI would be grossly cavalier.

Regarding attitudes about AGI, that's probably a bigger topic for another time.  But regarding your and your loved ones' life expectancy, from a mundane perspective (which leaves out much that is actually very relevant), it would presumably be some small number of decades without AGI---less if the people you love are elderly or seriously ill.  Given aligned AGI, it could be extremely long (and immensely better in quality).  So even if we assume that AGI would arrive soon unless stopped (e.g. in 5 years) and would result in immediate death if unaligned (which is very far from a given), then it seems like your life expectancy would be vastly longer if AGI developed even if the chance of alignment were quite small.

These beginnings could never have happened through quiet dealings and gently laid plans. They happened because people were honest and loud.

I don't doubt that loud people sometimes make things happen, though all-too-often the things they make happen turn out to have been for the worse.  For my own part, I don't feel there's such a deficit of loud people in the world that it is my calling to rush out and join them.  This is partly a matter of personality, but I hope there's a niche from which one can try to contribute in a more detached manner (and that there is value in a "rationalist project" that seeks to protect and facilitate that).

Every known plan for a post-AGI world is one which I do not expect my loved ones to survive.

I think your life expectancy and that of your loved ones (at least from a mundane perspective) is longer if AGI is developed than if it isn't.

Btw, the OGI model is not primarily intended for a post-AGI world, but rather for a near-term or intermediary stage.

However, I agree that if somebody thinks that we should completely stop AGI then the OGI model would presumably not be the way to go.  It is presented as an alternative to other governance models for the development of AGI (such as Manhattan project, CERN, Intelsat, etc.).  This paper doesn't address the desirability of developing AGI.

to shut down frontier AI development and preserve our very lives — a thing that unlike alignment we actually know is possible to achieve —

Fwiw, I think it's more likely that AI will be aligned than that it will be shut down.

I am grateful that you have spread awareness of the risk of human extinction from AI. I am genuinely saddened that you seem to be working to bring it about.

One has to take the rough with the smooth...  (But really, you seem to be misattributing motive to me here.)

If we here who know the stakes are not united in our call to shut down frontier AI development and preserve our very lives — a thing that unlike alignment we actually know is possible to achieve — then what was the rationalist project ever about?

I see it more like a flickering candle straining to create a small patch of visibility in an otherwise rather dark environment.  Strong calls for unanimity and falling into line with a political campaign message is a wind that might snuff it out.

It becomes partly terminological, but I would say that China-OGI-1 would by definition be a situation in which global investors in a Chinese company that develops AGI enjoy reasonably reliable assurances that their property rights would be largely respected.  It seems maybe more attractive than the closest alternatives (i.e. a situation in which AGI is developed by a Chinese company and international investors don't have reasonable assurances that their rights would be protected, or a situation in which AGI is developed by a Chinese Manhattan project)?  So the factors you point to don't affect the desirability of China-OGI-1 but rather the probability of that version of the OGI model becoming instantiated.

Btw, I should maybe also reemphasize that I'm putting forward the model more so that it can be considered alongside other models that have been proposed, rather than as something that I have a strong or definitive commitment to.  I could easily imagine coming to favor other approaches, either as a result of arguments or because of changes in the world that alters the practical landscape.  I generally have a high level of uncertainty about the politics/governance/macrostrategy of AI (doubly so in the Chinese context, where I have even less understanding), and I tend to think we'll need to feel and negotiate our way forward one tentative step at a time rather than operate on a fixed plan.

I always thought it was totally crazy for people to lump Nick Bostrom and Marc Andreessen together into TESCREAL and criticize them in the same breath, but this post plays right into such criticism.

I'm also bald...

This idea/plan seems to legitimize giving founders and early investors of AGI companies extra influence on or ownership of the universe (or just extremely high financial returns, if they were to voluntarily sell some shares to the public as envisioned here), which is hard for me to stomach from a fairness or incentives perspective, given that I think such people made negative contributions to our civilizational trajectory by increasing x-risk.

One question is whether a different standard should be applied in this case than elsewhere in our capitalist economy (where, generally, the link between financial rewards and positive or negative contributions to xrisk reduction is quite tenuous).  One could argue that this is the cooperative system we have in place, and that there should be a presumption against retroactively confiscating people who invested their time or money on the basis of the existing rules.  (Adjusting levels of moral praise in light of differing estimations of the nature of somebody's actions or intentions may be a more appropriate place for this type of consideration to feed in.  Though it's perhaps also worth noting that the prevailing cultural norms at the time, and still today, seem to favor contributing to the development more advanced AI technologies.)

Furthermore, it would be consistent with the OGI model for governments (particularly the host government) to take some actions to equalize or otherwise adjust outcomes.  For example, many countries, including the U.S., have a progressive taxation system, and one could imaging adding some higher tax brackets beyond those that currently exist - such as an extra +10% marginal tax rate for incomes or capital gains exceeding 1 trillion dollars, or exceeding 1% of GDP, or whatever.  (In the extreme, if taxation rates began approaching 100%, this would become confiscatory and would be incompatible with the OGI model; but there is plenty of room below that for society to choose some level of redistribution.)

the governance philosophy here seems to be "let the companies do as they will and let events unfold as they may"

That is not quite right.  The idea is rather that the government does whatever it does by regulating companies, or possibly entering into some soft-nationalization public-private partnership, as opposed to by operating an AGI project on its own (as in the Manhattan model) or by handing it over to an international agency or consortium (as in the CERN and Intelsat models).

There doesn't seem to be anything here which addresses the situation in which one company tries to take over the world using its AGI, or in which an AGI acting on its own initiative tries to take over the world, etc.

It doesn't particularly address the situation in which an AGI on its own initiative tries to take over the world.  That is a concern common to all of the governance models.  In the OGI model, there are two potential veto points: the company itself can choose not to develop or a deploy an AI that it deems too risky, and the host government can prevent the company from developing or deploying an AI that fails to meet some standard that the government stipulates.  (In the Manhattan model, there's only one veto point.)

As for the situation in which one company tries to take over the world using its AGI, the host government may choose to implement safeguards against this (e.g. by closely scrutinizing what AGI corporations are up to).  Note that there are analogous concerns in the alternative models, where e.g. a government lab or some other part of a government might try to use AGI for power grabs.  (Again, the double veto points in the OGI model might have some advantage here, although the issue is complicated.)