I wrote an introduction to Expected Value Fanaticism for Utilitarianism.net. Suppose there was a magical potion that almost certainly kills you immediately but offers you (and your family and friends) an extremely long, happy life with a tiny probability. If the probability of a happy life were one in a billion and the resulting life lasted one trillion years, would you drink this potion? According to Expected Value Fanaticism, you should accept gambles like that.

This view may seem, frankly, crazy - but there are some very good arguments in its favor. Basically, if you reject Expected Value Fanaticism, you'll end up violating some very plausible principles. You would have to believe, for example, that what happens on faraway exoplanets or what happened thousands of years ago in history could influence what we ought to do here and now, even when we cannot affect those distant events. This seems absurd - we don't need a telescope to decide what we morally ought to do.

However, the story is a bit more complicated than that... Well, read the article! Here's the link: https://utilitarianism.net/gue.../expected-value-fanaticism/

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