As a side note, Secret Hitler is actually a tabletop game which is about convincingly lying and identifying lies, but also counting probabilities like in poker. If the post author hasn't tried it, could recommend

They are used for cybercrime and rumored to be deployed for state-funded espionage.

To make it a little more substantial, web browsing agents with some OSINT skills (and multimedia models already geolocate photos made in Western urban areas comparably with human experts) offer prospects of automatizing or at least significantly speeding up (making much cheaper) targeted attacks like spearphishing

A quick side note: in the 17 years which have passed since the post you cite had been written historiography of connectionism moved on, and we now know that modern backpropagation was invented as early as 1970 and first applied to neural nets in 1982 (technology transfer was much harder before web search!), see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backpropagation#Modern_backpropagation and references thereof

I think it does, among other things, actually investigate cross-border crime but just on a small scale due to limited resources, check this: https://www.frontex.europa.eu/what-we-do/operations/operations

police force

Actually, since 2016 EU has a relatively small (~3700 officers as of this writing, which is about 1/6 larger than police of Luxembourg) border police force called Frontex! EU president would like to increase it an order of magnitude in a few years, but member states are not very enthusiastic

Why would anyone want to pay a fortune for a system that is expected to let ~40 warheads through (assuming ~99% overall interception rate which will require average rate of 99.99+%), about the same as the number of ICBMs the Soviet Union had in service during the Cuban Missile Crisis? Unacceptable damage is the cornerstone of the nuclear deterrence, MAD or not (there is no MAD between India and Pakistan, for example).

The RV separation distance is normally around ~100 km (even up to 300 km in some cases) not 10 km, and the decoy dispersal might be expected on the same order of magnitude. It will be easy to ramp it up BTW with a cheap modernization.

None of the US adversaries really practice counterforce targeting, so the silo protection is moot.

lower EQ

I don't think it's relevant here: judging by the EQ-Bench leaderboard, GPT-5 is on par with GPT-4o and has far higher EQ than any of the Anthropic models!

Even if it has some influence, it should be much less than the emoji usage (remember the scandal about the Llama 4 on LMSys) and certainly incomparable to the sycophancy

I like to imagine the whole GPT-5 launch from the perspective of a cigarette company. 

OpenAI is Philip Morris over here. Realized they make a product that addicts and hurts people. Instead of feeding it, they cut it off. The addicts went insane and OpenAI unfortunately caved.

— u/ohwut at https://www.reddit.com/r/OpenAI/comments/1mlzo12/comment/n7uko9n

one or more warheads are blown up at limits of interceptor range

Not range but height. You blow up a warhead high enough the drones can't intercept it, and all the drones below fall out of the air

You seem to believe that radars and infrared cameras can somehow distinguish between the decoys and the warheads, but they can't. In space, no radar and no IR camera can differentiate between a conical foil balloon with a small heater inside and a reentry vehicle with a nuke.

Another problem of ballistic missile defense is that once you are dealing with nukes and not conventional warheads, you can't afford, say, a 97% average interception rate, it must be 99.999+%^[1]. To put this in context, Israel, which currently has the best BMD system in the world, couldn't even reliably achieve 90% against Iranian MRBMs (and those are pretty unsophisticated, e. g. they lack MIRVs and decoys).

Now calculate how many interceptors your plan requires for a plausible probability of an interception with a single drone, and you will see it's entirely unworkable. Note that both arguments are based on simple physics and math so don't depend on the progress in technology at all.

If you are interested in the topic, I strongly recommend reading on the Soviet response to SDI for more expensive anti-ABM options that were considered but ultimately not pursued: https://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_end_the_col.html

1. ^{^}

   When this seemingly waterproof probability is raised to the power of the Russian warhead count it still results in ~4% (basically 1e-5 times ~4k) of at least one RV not intercepted, and in reality hundreds of warheads will be harder to intercept than the average one you accounted for when calculating your probability. E. g., drones work poorly in bad weather, and it's almost always bad weather above at least some of American cities