I've actually used Bayesian perspectives (maximum entropy, etc) but I've never looked at it as a subjective degree of plausibility. Based on the Wikipedia article, I guess I haven't been looking at it the way others have. I understand where Eli is coming from in applying Information theory. He doesn't have complete information, so he won't say that he has probability 1. He could get another bit of information which changes his belief, but he thinks (based on prior observation) that is very low.

I guess, I have problem with him maybe overreaching. It doesn't make sense to say that this subjective personal probability (which, by the way, he chose to calculate based on a tiny subset of the vast amounts of information he has in his mind) based on his observed evidence is somehow the absolute probability that, say, evolution is "true".

Thank you.

I've actually used Bayesian perspectives (maximum entropy, etc) but I've never looked at it as a subjective degree of plausibility. Based on the Wikipedia article, I guess I haven't been looking at it the way others have. I understand where Eli is coming from in applying Information theory. He doesn't have complete information, so he won't say that he has probability 1. He could get another bit of information which changes his belief, but he thinks (based on prior observation) that is very low.

I guess, I have problem with him maybe overreaching. It doesn't make sense to say that this subjective personal probability (which, by the way, he chose to calculate based on a tiny subset of the vast amounts of information he has in his mind) based on his observed evidence is somehow the absolute probability that, say, evolution is "true".