Consciousness being defined as a system with an “internal observer” is problematic first because of an infinite regress if you mean an observer is something with subjective experience which would require it to have an internal observer. I think the entire premise here is too dualist, and it presupposes subjectivity as a prerequisite to itself.
Neuroscience hints that a structure analogous to an internal observer doesn’t seem to exist, and it’s still a mystery how we feel a unified stream of consciousness (the binding problem).
Your definition of self-awareness isn’t very detailed, but there is no reason to think animals are less self aware than us based on any definition I can think of.... (read more)
Consciousness being defined as a system with an “internal observer” is problematic first because of an infinite regress if you mean an observer is something with subjective experience which would require it to have an internal observer. I think the entire premise here is too dualist, and it presupposes subjectivity as a prerequisite to itself.
Neuroscience hints that a structure analogous to an internal observer doesn’t seem to exist, and it’s still a mystery how we feel a unified stream of consciousness (the binding problem).
Your definition of self-awareness isn’t very detailed, but there is no reason to think animals are less self aware than us based on any definition I can think of.... (read more)