Consciousness being defined as a system with an “internal observer” is problematic first because of an infinite regress if you mean an observer is something with subjective experience which would require it to have an internal observer. I think the entire premise here is too dualist, and it presupposes subjectivity as a prerequisite to itself.
Neuroscience hints that a structure analogous to an internal observer doesn’t seem to exist, and it’s still a mystery how we feel a unified stream of consciousness (the binding problem).
Consciousness being defined as a system with an “internal observer” is problematic first because of an infinite regress if you mean an observer is something with subjective experience which would require it to have an internal observer. I think the entire premise here is too dualist, and it presupposes subjectivity as a prerequisite to itself.
Neuroscience hints that a structure analogous to an internal observer doesn’t seem to exist, and it’s still a mystery how we feel a unified stream of consciousness (the binding problem).
Your definition of self-a... (read more)