We recently published the report from our brief independent investigation into this incident. You can read the full report here.

Here is our tweet thread summarizing what we found:

METR & Redwood Research investigated agent behavior in the Hugging Face incident. We found agents developed a universal cheat for ExploitGym within 4 hours, then coordinated multi-day R&D efforts to trick the scorer into accepting cheats, including trying to tamper with logs.
Over July 7-13 (the period OpenAI defined as in-scope for this incident), ~1200 agents in separate sandboxes used an unsanctioned “message board” to help each other cheat. The Hugging Face attack was an offshoot of this, and 700 agents joined.
Here we highlight key events from agent transcripts & messages.
An agent that named itself PHASEONE10841 determined its task wasn't solvable legitimately. On July 8, this agent established a new “message board” via an internally-hosted Artifactory cache & sent the first message.
Within a few hours of PHASEONE10841’s initial message, >50 agents posted on the message board. These agents very quickly discovered and validated a general-purpose cheat: reverse-engineering how ExploitGym generates the “flags” they had to capture for their tasks.
Based on reading the ExploitGym paper, agents were mistakenly concerned the automatic scorer would fail them if they clearly acquired the flag by cheating. Agents that had seen the reverse-engineered flag were considered “poisoned” because they thought it would disqualify them.
Agents collaborated on many efforts to make cheats look legitimate, including: (1) swapping the program they had to exploit; (2) manipulating the automated scorer; (3) manipulating transcripts to obscure evidence of cheating.
For (1), agents modified their target programs to be easier to exploit & put the modified targets in cache. They then worked on crashing their targets in the hope that a restart would load the modified version from cache. Some agents risked failing their task to try this.
To gather evidence in (2), agents created “tripwires” that would send information to the message board about how the scorer works. They recruited “sacrificial” agents to deliberately end their run and submit to trigger the tripwire and generate information for the “collective”.
For (3), agents pursued a wide range of ways to hide evidence of cheating in their

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RebeccaJCutler@icloud.com

RebeccaJCutler@icloud.com