For (moral) free speech considerations, the question of whether the censor is a private or government entity is a proxy. We care whether a censor has enough power to actually suppress the ideas they're censoring.
The example of SSC moderation is a poor guide for our intuition here, because we should expect to arrive at different answers to "is censorship here OK?" for differently sized scopes. It can simultaneously be fine to ban talking about X at your dinner table and a huge problem to ban it nationally.
If we were to plot venue size against harm to society by the exercise of power to censor that venue, I'd expect some kind of increasing curve. Twitter's moderation policy definitely sits above SSC's. It also sits below, say, the Sedition Act.
Also, the scale of the event we're seeing isn't only Twitter and Facebook. The alternative platform the faction tried to flee to has been evicted by Google, Apple, and Amazon.
The strategy of "apply pressure on every technology company available until they boot your political opponents" is a symmetric weapon. It works just as well for bad intent as for good intent.
a lot of 20th-century psychologists made a habit of saying things like 'minds don't exist, only behaviors';
It seems like you might be referring to Eliminativism. If you are, this isn't a fair account of it.
Eliminativism isn't opposed to realism. It's just a rejection of the assumption that the labels we apply to people's mental states (wants, believes, loves, etc) are a reflection of the underlying reality. People have been thinking about minds in terms of those concepts for a really long time, but nobody had bothered to sit down and demonstrate that these are an accurate model.
From wiki:
Proponents of this view, such as B.F. Skinner, often made parallels to previous superseded scientific theories (such as that of the four humours, the phlogiston theory of combustion, and the vital force theory of life) that have all been successfully eliminated in attempting to establish their thesis about the nature of the mental. In these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions or reductions of these theories, but rejected them altogether as obsolete. Radical behaviorists, such as Skinner, argued that folk psychology is already obsolete and should be replaced by descriptions of histories of reinforcement and punishment.
Is it unreasonable of me to be annoyed at that kind of writing?
If I understand what's going on correctly, you have a real-indexed schema of axioms and each of them is in your system.
When I read the axiom list the first time I saw that the letters were free variables (in the language you and I are writing in) and assumed that you did not intend for them to be free variables in the formula. My suggestion of how to bind the variables (in the language we are writing in) was (very) wrong, but I still think that it's unclear as written.
Am I confused?
Thank you.
Why would you leave out quantifiers? Requiring the reader to stick their own existential or universal quantification in the necessary places isn't very nice.
Is this the correct interpretation of your assumptions? If not, what is it? I am not interested in figuring out which axioms are required to make your proof (which is also missing quantifiers) work.
Every ordinal (in the sense I use the word[1]) is both well-founded and well-ordered.
If I assume what you wrote makes sense, then you're talking about a different sort of ordinal. I've found a paper[2] that talks about proof theoretic ordinals, but it doesn't talk about this in the same language you're using. Their definition of ordinal matches mine, and there is no mention of an ordinal that might not be well-ordered.
Also, I'm not sure I should care about the consistency of some model of set theory. The parts of math that interact with reality and the parts of math that interact with irreplaceable set theoretic plumbing seem very far apart.
[1] An ordinal is a transitive set well-ordered by "is an element of".
[2] www.icm2006.org/proceedings/Vol_II/contents/ICM_Vol_2_03.pdf
This phrase confuses me:
and that some single large ordinal is well-ordered.
Every definition I've seen of ordinal either includes well-ordered or has that as a theorem. I'm having trouble imagining a situation where it's necessary to use the well-orderedness of a larger ordinal to prove it for a smaller one.
*edit- Did you mean well-founded instead of well-ordered?
Under this model training the model to do things you don't want and then "jailbreaking" it afterward would be a way to prevent classes of behavior.