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Asserting something doesn't make it so, but everyone has different opinions, and that's okay.  

To me, the conscious experience when you see a red apple, for example, is just the association of certain memories of:

  • The physical taste of the apple (certain taste receptors activating neurons to the brain) and maybe the memory of the feeling of hunger when you've eaten apples
  • The people near you or the places where you've eaten apples in the past (maybe apple picking, at home, etc.)
  • The neural concept of apple and red and all their associated memories 

These memories all appear in the movie screen in your mind (which itself is some kind of neural activity) when you see the red apple, and they may stimulate the same feelings in you now as they did in the past.  Memories are just certain neural constructs (ions flowing in and out of channels, arrangement and connentions of dendrites, etc.)

    That's my view, but of course it's just an opinion and everyone has their own view.

Hi.  My comment is kind of long, so sorry about that up front.  

  1. In regard to 

    “the exact states of our minds follow in principle purely mathematically from that fundamental mathematical theory, including the fact that we know that this universe “exists”…this implies that the existence of our universe is in principle a mathematical implication of the fundamental theory that describes our universe.”

    The state of our minds and the existence of our universe doesn’t follow from a mathematical theory.  It follows from the reality that the mathematical theory describes.

2. In the first paragraph of the discussion, 

there presumably are a range of mathematical universes that are in principle definable but don’t describe any reality, that contain creatures which think (cogito). But those creatures don’t actually exist, which seems to show that the inference is wrong.

mathematical universes exist in the mind of the person thinking about them in this universe.  Mathematical universes, or any possible constructs, that exist in the mind are different existent entities than what exists in actuality. 

3. I think the hard problem of consciousness is only hard because people seem to believe that thoughts and feelings are intangible, non-physical things.   If they exist in the brain, then the problem of consciousness, or what I think is more important self-awareness, isn’t as hard as we make it out to be.  It’s more just a biochemical, neuronal connection, engineering problem.

4. Suggestions that mathematical constructs, logic, etc. exist independent of the physical universe in some Platonic realm that no one can see, point out or experimentally demonstrate is not much different than religious faith to me.  It’s possible, but no one can really provide physical evidence for it.  It seems like creating a whole new Platonic realm to explain in addition to our universe makes things much harder than they need to be.

5. In regard to the main idea of "Why is there something rather than nothing?", others have suggested that the seeming insolubility of the question may not be because it's insoluble, but because there's a misunderstanding or a false assumption in the question.  I agree with this.  In the below, I'd like to challenge the assumption that what we usually consider to be "nothing" is in fact "nothing" and not an existent entity, or a "something".

Before beginning, it's very important to distinguish between the mind's conception of "nothing" and "nothing" itself, in which the mind would not be there.  When I use the term "nothing", I'm talking about "nothing" itself.  While one can't visualize this directly, it's important to try and get close and then extrapolate to what it might be like if the mind were not there.

    I think that to ever get a satisfying answer to the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?", we're going to have to address the possibility that there could have been "nothing", but now there is "something".  If this supposed "nothing” before the "something" was truly the lack of all existent entities, there would be no mechanism present to change, or transform, this “nothingness” into the “something” that is here now. But, because we can see that “something” is here now, the only possible choice if we start with "nothing" is that the supposed “nothing” we were thinking of was not in fact the lack of all existent entities, or absolute “nothing” but was in fact a "something".  Another way to say this is that if you start with a 0 (e.g., "nothing") and end up with a 1 (e.g., "something"), you can't do this unless somehow the 0 isn't really a 0 but is actually a 1 in disguise, even though it looks like 0 on the surface.  That is, in one way of thinking "nothing" just looks like "nothing".  But, if we think about "nothing" in a different way, we can see through its disguise and see that it's a "something". This then gets back around to the idea that "something" has always been here except now there's a reason why: because even what we think of as "nothing" is a "something".

    How can "nothing" be a "something"?  I think it's first important to try and figure out why any “normal” thing (like a book, or a set) can exist and be a “something”. I propose that a thing exists if it is a grouping.  A grouping ties stuff together into a unit whole and, in so doing, defines what is contained within that new unit whole.  This grouping together of what is contained within provides a surface, or boundary, that defines what is contained within, that we can see and touch as the surface of the thing and that gives "substance" and existence to the thing as a new unit whole that's a different existent entity than any components contained within considered individually.  This leads to the idea that a thing only exists where and when the grouping exists.  For instance, groupings can exist inside a person's mind or outside the mind.  For outside-the-mind groupings, like a book, the grouping is physically present and visually seen as an edge, boundary, or enclosing surface that defines this unit whole/existent entity. For inside-the-mind groupings, like the concept of a car (also, fictional characters like Sherlock Holmes, etc.), the grouping may be better thought of as the top-level label the mind gives to the mental construct that groups together other constructs into a new unit whole (i.e., the mental construct labeled “car” groups together the constructs of engine, car chassis, tires, use for transportation, etc.).  This idea of a unit whole or a unity as being related to why things exist isn't new, but I think its application in providing a reason why what has traditionally thought of as “nothing” is actually an existent entity

    Next, when you get rid of all matter, energy, space/volume, time, abstract concepts, laws or constructs of physics/math/logic, possible worlds/possibilities, properties, consciousness, and finally minds, including the mind of the person trying to imagine this supposed lack of all, we think that this is the lack of all existent entities, or "absolute nothing" But, once everything is gone and the mind is gone, this situation, this "absolute nothing", would, by its very nature, define the situation completely. This "nothing" would be it; it would be the all. It would be the entirety, or whole amount, of all that is present. Is there anything else besides that "absolute nothing"? No. It is "nothing", and it is the all. An entirety/defined completely/whole amount/"the all" is a grouping, which means that the situation we previously considered to be "absolute nothing" is itself an existent entity. It's only once all things, including all minds, are gone does “nothing” become "the all" and a new unit whole that we can then, after the fact, see from the outside as a whole unit. One might object and say that being a grouping is a property so how can it be there in "nothing"? The answer is that the property of being a grouping (e.g., the all grouping) only appears after all else, including all properties and the mind of the person trying to imagine this, is gone. In other words, the very lack of all existent entities is itself what allows this new property of being the all grouping to appear.

Some important points are:

1. The words "was" (i.e., "was nothing") and "then"/"now" (i.e., "then something") in the above imply a temporal change, time would not exist until there was "something", so I don't use these words in a time sense. Instead, I suggest that the two different words, “nothing” and “something”, describe the same situation (e.g., "the lack of all"), and that the human mind can view the switching between the two different words, or ways of visualizing "the lack of all", as a temporal change from "was" to "now".

2. Because  the mind's conception of "nothing" and "nothing" itself are two different things, our talking about "nothing" itself (which is derived from the mind's conception of "nothing") doesn't reify "nothing" itself.  Our talking about it has nothing to do with whether or not "nothing" itself exists or not.

3. It's very important to distinguish between the mind's conception of "nothing" and "nothing" itself, in which no minds would be there. These are two different things. Logically, this is indisputable. In visualizing "nothing" one has to try to imagine what it's like when no minds are there.  Of course, this is impossible, but we can try to extrapolate.

4. We think about and visualize “nothing” in our minds, which exist and are “somethings”.  In our existent minds, “nothing” just looks like nothing, but from this, we cannot then just assume that “nothing” itself, in which our minds are gone, would not then gain the property of being the all grouping and thus be a “something”.  I believe this unfounded assumptions is what has held us back from solving the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?”.

    If you've read this far, thanks for wading through my probably excess wording!