The title suggests (weakly perhaps) that the estimates themselves peer-reviewed. Would be clearer to write "building on" peer reviewed argument, or similar.
In the early stages, I had in mind that the more info any individual anon-account revealed, the more easily one could infer what time they spent at Leverage, and therefore their identity. So while I don't know for certain, I would guess that I created anonymoose to disperse this info across two accounts.
When I commented on the Basic Facts post as anonymoose, It was not my intent to contrive a fake conversation between two entities with separate voices. I think this is pretty clear from anonymoose's comment, too - it's in the same bulleted and dry format that throwaway uses, so it's an immediate possibility that throwaway and anonymoose are one and the same. I don't know why I used anonymoose there. Maybe due to carelessness, or maybe because I lost access to throwaway. (I know that at one time, an update to the forum login interface did rob me of access to my anon-account, but not sure if this was when that happened).
"A Russian nuclear strike would change the course of the conflict and almost certainly provoke a "physical response" from Ukraine's allies and potentially from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a senior NATO official said on Wednesday.
Any use of nuclear weapons by Moscow would have "unprecedented consequences" for Russia, the official said on the eve of a closed-door meeting of NATO's nuclear planning group on Thursday.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, he said a nuclear strike by Moscow would "almost certainly be drawing a physical response from many allies, and potentially from NATO itself".
I have heard of talk that the US might instead arm Ukraine with tactical nukes of its own, although I think that would be at least comparably risky as military retaliation.
The reasoning is that retaliating is US doctrine - they generally respond to hostile actions in-kind, to deter them. If Ukraine got nuked, the level of outrage would place intense pressure on Biden to do something, and the hawks would become a lot louder than the doves, similar to after the 9/11 attacks. In the case of Russia, the US has exhausted most non-military avenues already. And US is a very militaristic country - they have many times bombed countries (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya) for much less. So military action just seems very likely. (Involving all of NATO or not, as michel says.)
I think your middle number is clearly too low. The risk scenario does not require that NATO trigger article 5 necessarily, but just that they carry out a strategically significant military response, like eliminating Russia's Black Sea Fleet, nuking, or creating a no-fly zone. And Max's 80% makes more sense than your 50% for he union of these possibilities, because it is hard to imagine that the US would stand down without penalising the use of nukes.
I would be at maybe .2*.8*.15=.024 for this particular chain of events leading to major US-Russia nuclear war.
All of these seem to be good points, although I haven't given up on liquidity subsidy schemes yet.
Some reports are not publicised in order not to speed up timelines. And ELK is a bit rambly - I wonder if it will get subsumed by much better content within 2yr. But I do largely agree.
It would be useful to have a more descriptive title, like "Chinchilla's implications for data bottlenecks" or something.
It's noteworthy that the safety guarantee relies on the "hidden cost" (:= proxy_utility - actual_utility) of each action being bounded above. If it's unbounded, then the theoretical guarantee disappears.
For past work on causal conceptions of corrigibility, you should check out this by Jessica Taylor. Quite similar.