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I once spoke with David Schmidtz, a philosophy at the University of Arizona, about Scwartz's work. All he shows is that more choices makes people anxious and confused. But Dave told me that he got Scwartz to admit that being anxious and confused isn't the same way as having a net utility decrease. I...(read more)
You'll find the whole thing pretty interesting, although it concerns decision theory more than the rationality of belief, although these are deeply connected (the connection is an interesting topic for speculation in itself). Here's a brief summary of the book. I'm pretty partial to it.
Thinking ab...(read more)
Should be 'a serious challenge'
There's also an assumption that ideal rationality is coherent (and even rational) for bounded agents like ourselves. Probability theorist and epistemologist John Pollock has launched a series challenge to this model of decision making in his recent 06 book Thinking About Acting.
Eliezer said: "If Overcoming Bias has any religious readers left, I say to you: it may be that you will someday lose your faith: and on that day, you will not lose all sense of moral direction."
He's addressing all religious people here, right? I responded to this comment as a theistic philosopher....(read more)
Overcoming Bias DOES have a religious reader left. Me. I'm a philosopher with strong interests in political philosophy and philosophy of religion. I had several problems with the post:
You say that if we lose our belief in God that we won't lose our moral compass altogether. But that isn't the only...(read more)
You say: "if you can invent an equally persuasive explanation for any outcome, you have zero knowledge."
You'll want to read Quine on this. Quine thought that for nearly any sufficiently large data set there were an infinite number of theories that could accurately explain it. Now, grante...(read more)
Unless of course you've already piled through these matters. If so, then link me and I'll shut up. A cursory check yielded little.
You say: "If you genuinely subject your conclusion to a criticism that can potentially de-conclude it - if the criticism genuinely has that power - then that does modify "the real algorithm behind" your conclusion."
Why do you think it's an epistemic duty to appeal to subject your views t...(read more)
Eliezer, Thomas Scanlon discusses this issue in the 'Aggregation' Section of Chapter 5 of his What We Owe To Each Other. Philosophers have been on it for awhile.