Sometimes in an argument, an older opponent might claim that perhaps as I grow older, my opinions will change, or that I'll come around on the topic. Implicit in this claim is the assumption that age or quantity of experience is a proxy for legitimate authority. In and of itself, such "life experience" is necessary for an informed rational worldview, but it is not sufficient.
The claim that more "life experience" will completely reverse an opinion indicates that the person making such a claim believes that opinions from others are based primarily on accumulating anecdotes, perhaps derived from extensive availability bias. It actually is a pretty decent assumption that other people aren't Bayesian,... (read 169 more words →)
I'm going to try to make it.
David Friedman laments another misuse of frequentism.
I know this is an old thread, but for any people just now reading it, I thought I'd pass along this bizarre development.
This is a fallacious amphiboly, so it's deductively wrong. There's no need to even bring up induction here, and Bayesian inference is for induction. It's a category error to criticize that Bayesian inference doesn't apply. It would be like asking Bayesian inference to cook me dinner.
Sorry I missed this. I'll try to attend the next one. I suggest Capital City Brewery at Metro Center.
There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty
He seems to have understood that 0 and 1 are not probabilities.
For those interested, Netflix has a new documentary out about the case: https://youtu.be/9r8LG_lCbac
I recommend a related essay by Hayek, "Competition as a Discovery Procedure."
You really should read Taleb; you can probably start with The Black Swan. His terms for these are "Mediocristan," domains that are described by Gaussian distributions, and "Extremistan," domains that are described by power laws.