Subjectivism and moral authority

I can make sense of authority from a subjectivist viewpoint. People might be suggestible, there might be some quirks of their psychology that make them behave in certain ways, ropes you can pull that get you specific results. That is a command can be a hack attempt to exploit the other. Assuming that the other is completely reflectively consistent might grant them exploit-freeness. But most real system do have hack vulnerabilities.

This might not be that popular a viewpoint because it can get very anti-coperative. If you argue someone into a position that they would transition away when reflecting it is not a stable reflection of deeper principles.

If you truly oppose Clippy you migth be morally fine trying to confuse and get them to act against their values to the extent that you can. But in polite company ethical discussion regressing a participant can get heavily frowned upon.

In hacking terms if you have root-access you are free to do as you please but that position might still be ill-gotten. You might not actually have any business wielding admin powers. The system doesn't condition its compliance for intents and purposes but that it is given in the correct from and from the right channels. In this sense "authorization" doesn't actually have to do with authority.

The "stop" can also seen as a suggestion given in the hopes that it finds purchase. I think being too knowledgeable about the perpetrators evil would make you not try or you would know that you effective before hand. Only when you don't know by which mechanism the prompt would land would you give it a blind shot. It is like spitting out a conjecture in hopes they prove it to themselfs. If you knew of a proof you would state it, if you didn't think they are intelligent enough to consider the matter you would stay silent.

In Milgrams experiment it is not required that the experimenter and test subject agree on ethics to a great degree. But the effect of the white coats suppressing the zealousness of the test subjects is a real thing. And I would think that the setup could be made make the opposite "moral authority" stance, like having Amnesty fliers on the walls or engaging in ethical discussion amid the "training" questions etc.

Naïve Set Theory - Part 1: Construction of Sets

Just because you personally don't understand doesn't mean that somebody else could not.

But you might also be getting to the distinction that "all sets" is a proper class whereas numbers can be put into a set and are thus a small class.

Naïve Set Theory - Part 1: Construction of Sets

Within surreal number lingo the "construction ordering" is often referred to as "birthday" and -5 being younger than -10 becomes a thing one can prove. 1/2 has birthday just after 1 but 1/3 has birthday ω.

From the perspective that integers are sets of integers sets of integers do not come "after". That is if you first create the integers and then you try to form {0,1,2} that is not a new construction as 3 has already been formed. In that perspective "last integer" and "last set" are not that different. There is the distinction of a limit ordinal. If "natural numbers" is a set then making the singleton {natural numbers} can also be thought as a successor ordinal ie ω+1 and how the set "natural numbers" can be thought as the ordinal ω. So there is a process where one can think of giving infinite time to nest sets. One can even give another round to get up to ω*2.

In the other direction one can assume as little magically given base material as possible. Having nothing but how to make new numbers one can get 0 as the limit ordinal of ex nihilo.

Can you be 100% confident in your moral beliefs?

Confidence can be pretty straighforward if there is a separte outside reality to which correspondece is straightforward. Sometimes language is polymorphic in that vastly different things get covered in same or same sounding terms.

One potential categoy of categorization which moral statemdents might have is when the target of the statement is to be communally created. If half of a movie crew thought "We are making a romantic comedy" and another half thought "We are making a horror movie" there might be big trouble. If a creative leader has made a decision then being informed about it can be about accuracy in the traditional sense. However if the creative direction has never been discussed there might need to be the determination of the direction of the moive. Before such discussion has happened neither statement can be true. One of the possible outcomes is that group A goes a separated way to make a romantic comedy and group B goes to make a horror movie. If this happens in a sense both groups were right.

If a group of people goes out to make an arrangement where people do not backstab and kill each other mutually that can be a form of executive decision rather than an ethical discovery. If somebody then starts to "doubt" "maybe we should kill each other a little bit" that can be a form of setting out a different society or reforming the society to a different order. In this sense if somebody ask for your favorite color is it would be weird to be uncertain what your favorite color is. It would be really weird to read a proof to the effect of "your favorite color is actually green rather than red" and be convinced. Such things are true not because we discover them but because we stipulate them. Saying "maybe my favorite color is blue" is not knowing what your favorite color is or refusing to have a favorite color.

Now it seems open to me whether moral questions are such stipulative executive decisions. Under this kind of conception "murder is wrong, 95% confidence" can sound a lot like "I reserve a right to let 5% of murderers off the hook, but generally punish them."

The Glory System: A Model For Moral Currency And Distributed Self-Moderation

In the standard way when a "market of ideas" it is mean that some ideas are good or fruitful and will eventually be found that way or that some ideas have stronger arguments and can win out in debates.

Here the "market of ideas" functions in more immediate gut reactions. Ideas win out because their advocates are wealthy, not ideas winning out because their advocates are numerous. A contest of who waves their flags the most vigorous.

I guess there is a similar juxtaposition or sliding scale of democrasy vs demagogy.

In traditional democratic countries there is a universal and equal right to vote, everybody gets one. If you could buy additional votes if you wish, it would be significantly less egalitatrarian and signficantly more oligargic. Providing the winners of previous votes more voting power makes the system cascade into strong winners and losers fast.

The feeling of breaking an Overton window

Preventing autism induced ire from others throught masking sounds somewhat similar. Sometimes you want to mask tot he extent that you can but you just can't all the way. Expecting people to be weirded out but the "deficiency" not being an internal signal to change stance.

Depersonalization when trying forcefully to fit illfitting social roles is also not unheard of.

Remember that to value something infinitely is usually to give it a finite dollar value

If the care chooser is maximising expected life-years ie favours saving the young then he can be "inconsistent".

Also if you had enough money you would just buy all the options. The only options that get dropped are those that interfere with more saving options.

If somebody truly considered a life to be worth some dollar amount and their budjet was increased then they would still pick the same options but end up with a bigger pile of cash. Given that this "considers worth to be" floats with the budjet I doubt that treating it as a dollar amount is a good idea.

The opportunity cost is still real thougth. If you use a doctor to save someone that means you can't simultanously use them to save another. So assigning a doctor or equipment you are simultanousy saving and endangering lives. And being too stubborn about your decisio making just means you endaangerment side of things just grows without bound.

How Strong is Our Connection to Truth?

With effectiveness my doubt is that you iss kinds of knowledge in your definition and that logic might be less than effective in the grander scheme of things. For example the knowledge of how to ride a bike is hard to get into the scope of logic, in that respect logic is incomplete ie it leaves a bit of knowledge out. There is the issue with Mary's room and whether color experience counts as knowledge, we can grant her allthe math test books and science books but we can still doubt whether we have caught all knowledge. Even the context of "effective method" Turing suspected that mathematicians use a kind of "insight" that coming up with a proof is a different kind of process than following a proof. Universal turing machine captures "effective method" which encompasses all of formal mathematics that person could write down. But still doubt lingers whether that is all the intersting kind of processes.

One could also be worried about a method of knowing that encapsulates logic. Divine relevation could be posited to give vast amounts of knowledge maybe enough so that further knowledge production work ceases to be viable. There is also the "trivial theory of arithmetic" where we just assume all arithmetic truths as axioms. In such a system there are no theorems, there is only a check whether or not a thing is a axiom or not. Such a system could be all encompassing and avoid the use of logical inference.

Starting point is a bit undefined, axiomaatic approach is way more defined. Sure we don'thave super cdertani "boot-system" on how we get going. But it doesn't feature the characteristics of a axiomatic system. In the axiomatic style you can go "Assume X. Is it the case that X?" and you can definetely that "yes, X is the case". If you tried to shoehorn the sensory reliance in axiomatic terms it would go something like "Assume X. Now turns out that X isn't the case" which is non-sense in proof terms. Sure there is appeal to absurdity "Entertain subthought:[Assume X. X leads to contradiction]. Because subthought is contradictory the axiom set can't all be true at the same time. Therefore not-X.". But when our sensory expectations are violated they are not appeals to absurdity, it is more of a trial and error of "Guess X. If X then Y is a prosperous choice. Experience of Y is very unprosperous. Regard X as bad guess.". A purely axiomatic approach will always refes to the starting definitions to resolve issues of truth. We don't need to guess our axioms because we assume them true, which in effect we define to be true. "Assume all Xs are Y", "well what if I find an X that isn't Y?", "then it is not an X, thefore you can't find an X that isn't Y"

I get that getting asteroided would be my business. But knowing what half of china is going to have for lunch tomorrow really isn't, I am fine not knowing that I am fine that I don't have control over that they can have their culinary autonomy. When you would scan for impact asteroids you would not generally scan all things in the same way, but focus on paths and locations that could contain dangerous elements which means giving more scrutinity to some and less to others. There is also the issue of balancing the prediction horizon over several threats. Do you want to spend time getting an addtiional decade advance warning on a collider asteroid or do you want to get another decade advance warning on climate disaster? Just because you can fret about or control something doesn't mean you should. And integrating garbage can be more dangerous than acknowledging that you don't know.

How Strong is Our Connection to Truth?

One doesn't need to assume an objective reality if one wants to be agentic. One can believe that 1) Stuff you do influences your prosperity 2) It is possible select for more prosperous influences.

The use of the concept of "effective" is a bit wonky there and the word seems to carry a lot of the meaning. What I know of in my memory "effective method" is a measure of what a computer or mathematician is able to unambigiously specify. I have it hard to imagine to fairly judge a method to be ineffective.

Just because you need to have a starting point doesn't mean that your approach needs to be axiomatic.

It is unclear why planetary consiouness would be desirable. If you admit that you can't know what happen on the other side of the planet to a great degree you don't have to rely on unreliable data mediums. Typically your life happens here and not there. And even if "there" is relevant to your life it usually has an intermediary through which it affects stuff "here".

Semaglutide is cool, but no one wants to talk about b. animalis ssp. lactis?

I have pet pevees against weird epistemic statuses. Is talking about poop supposed to be a content warning? I don't think it fits within scope of epistemic status.

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