Slider's Comments

What are some unpopular (non-normative) opinions that you hold?

Following instructions doesn't really ring as a bell as a site goal. The setting of the question seems fair but the ill committed in ignoring the context is different from disobeyance.

Does the body have an almost infinite number of potential positions?

I contaminated myself because I thought it was a weird question by itself and had a smell of the answer being embedded in the context. In general "Does this analysis miss anything? I have not included analysis to avoid bias" isn't really an answerable question.

One of the tricks ot ponder on meanings is to wonder what the meaning stands in opposition to. To me it seems the statement plays the role of "enumerating the positions is not a fruitful way of approaching handling of positions" and if it is not enumerable then by theorycrafting it is probably some kind of infinity. And the example "proof" seems to be that for any proposal enumerating scheme you can take a position, apply a small mutator and end up with a position that is not covered by the original enumeration. A weaker versions results if only ""unlikely to be already enumerated".

Taking the logic a bit further it seems that the problem is already in "this position" where the pointing "this" can be ambigious in microparameters where trying to point to "one" position actually results in pointing to a whole class of positions. Thus "counting" positions is problematic and not really needed if we just want to undertand positions and their parameters/positions. So rather than there being a great many number of them an analysis is employed where we do not number them.

A similar thing could be made with water/ice. If you have icecubes it might make sense to count them. However if you have a cup of water or a block of ice it would be unnatural to place a integer amount to describe amount of water (althought with connection to avocadros number there probably is such a number) but neither it would make sense to say that a cup of water contains "infinite" amount of water. One might still care about big cup of water vs small cup of water. However the uncountable sense of size is not directly related to the countable sense of size (measure one in liters and one in objects).

Sets and Functions

You are making partially sense in that you are pointing to a modelling style but it does leave me unsure whether I can correctly fill in the missing bits. My thinking is interferred a lot by "getter functions" that are of the form [code]function get_color(self){ return self.color }. One of the point of such is that attributes tend to be private but methods are public and the programmer should he need to do so could change the implementation details without messing outside customers. So the modeeling style shares a similarity that objects are allowed to secretly have details outside of their interface. Sure if we have verbs and objects mixed up but can express object-like things as verbs by converting objects to verbs we only have to care about one basic ontology type. But I am unsure whether I missed it or is it fortcoming why it is important or valuable to focus on the verbs.

I am unsure what rule-basedness is but if it is different from extensional conception of functions then I would be super intrigued. I can get that sensing should be modelled with functions in that way but it seems contradictory how functions were supposed to be prediction or evolution models. So if I have a(b(c(d))) does it mean that first d goes throught two kinds of evolutions and is then observed or d goes throught one kind of evolution and then observation of that is observed. I am expecting this kind of divison is not an actual problem but I can't effortlessly go from the function formalism to observation/prediction formalisms and would likely make a lot of errors there.

Sets and Functions

That would the ambush part?

I would like to try double crux.

I think in your treatment between different monotheistic gods there would be evidence that would favour one god over another even if both start similarly dysmally low. However if you had two gods and they are indistinguishable from aliens then they should not be distinguishable from each other. I guess there are two senses in that in "evidence we currently have" vs "evidence that could ever exist". Like I would think that god hypothesis would not have increased probability for flying saucers. But if god doesn't raise the expectation of saucers does god raise the expectation of anything? If it doesn't raise the expectation of anything then there is nothing to disagree about because we don't mean anything.

I would like to try double crux.

What would count as successful contact? Can an outside person verify that contact has happened? If someone would convince you that your contact was actually confirmation bias would you change your opinion or probablity in god existing?

I would like to try double crux.

Paraphrasing: By the miracle I understand event or series of events that have either: a) extremely low probability, b) seems to break the laws of Nature or c) have significantly higher probability to occur in the world with God rather than without.

"Low probability events happen all the time"

'I do not believe in "miracles", in the sense that you probably mean'

The sense in which you replied to "miracles" seems not to be able to be understood in the literal definition provided, so you either used your own private definition or did not believe that their definition was accurately spelled out. Now the discussion has shifted and there has been an additonal feature added that miracles are connected to christian worship. If you are assuming they have additional properties it might be fruitful to be explicit about them.

I would like to try double crux.

if the clairvoyant knows any thing ie their experience correlates to anything then the other being is present. But I guess it would be hopeless to establish how reliable the information channel is using that information channel only.

I would like to try double crux.

It could be entirely consistent that the programmer made nature_1 within the constraints of nature_2 and "laws of nature" referring to nature_2 laws is unstandard and surprising. it would be an assumption that nature_2 has time. Sure there are hardware constraints but their exact shape is hard to argue (I could come up with examples how simulated time takes simulator space and not time).

I would like to try double crux.

If the evidence would be exactly the same for god as for other things shouldn't it be equally likely to be god rather than less likely?

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