Appreciate the pushback and your perspective. Two anchoring facts:
OpenSSL minted and published these CVEs (not us). They’re very conservative. Getting any CVE through their process is non-trivial. In 2025 we reported several issues. Some received CVEs, others were fixed without CVEs, which is normal under OpenSSL's security posture.
On your "AI vs human experts" point: the findings came from a fully autonomous analysis pipeline. We then manually verified and coordinated disclosure with maintainers. The takeaway: our stack surfaced previously unknown, CVE-worthy bugs in OpenSSL's hardened codebase. That’s hard to do by hand at scale.
Short answer: these aren't Heartbleed-class, but they're absolutely worth patching.
Two signals: (i) OpenSSL itself minted CVEs for them. This is non-trivial given its conservative posture, and (ii) fixes were backported across supported branches (3.5.4 / 3.4.3 / 3.3.5 / 3.2.6, with distro backports).
For context, per OpenSSL's own vulnerability index as of today (3 Nov 2025), there were 4 CVEs in 2025 YTD (CVE-2025-), 9 in 2024 (CVE-2024-), 18 in 2023 (CVE-2023-), 15 in 2022 (CVE-2022-). Getting any CVE there is hard. "Low/Medium" here mostly reflects narrow preconditions and prevalence within typical OpenSSL usage, not that the primitives themselves are trivial. The score (called CVSS) compresses likelihood and impact into one scalar.