steven0461

Steven K. (not to be confused with https://www.lesswrong.com/users/steve2152)

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In terms of "and those people who care will be broad and varied and trying their hands at making movies and doing varied kinds of science and engineering research and learning all about the world while keeping their eyes open for clues about the AI risk conundrum, and being ready to act when a hopeful possibility comes up" we're doing less well compared to my 2008 hopes. I want to know why and how to unblock it.

I think to the extent that people are failing to be interesting in all the ways you'd hoped they would be, it's because being interesting in those ways seems to them to have greater costs than benefits. If you want people to see the benefits of being interesting as outweighing the costs, you should make arguments to help them improve their causal models of the costs, and to improve their causal models of the benefits, and to compare the latter to the former. (E.g., what's the causal pathway by which an hour of thinking about Egyptology or repairing motorcycles or writing fanfic ends up having, not just positive expected usefulness, but higher expected usefulness at the margin than an hour of thinking about AI risk?) But you haven't seemed very interested in explicitly building out this kind of argument, and I don't understand why that isn't at the top of your list of strategies to try.

As far as I know, this is the standard position. See also this FAQ entry. A lot of people sloppily say "the universe" when they mean the observable part of the universe, and that's what's causing the confusion.

I have also talked with folks who’ve thought a lot about safety and who honestly think that existential risk is lower if we have AI soon (before humanity can harm itself in other ways), for example.

It seems hard to make the numbers come out that way. E.g. suppose human-level AGI in 2030 would cause a 60% chance of existential disaster and a 40% chance of existential disaster becoming impossible, and human-level AGI in 2050 would cause a 50% chance of existential disaster and a 50% chance of existential disaster becoming impossible. Then to be indifferent about AI timelines, conditional on human-level AGI in 2050, you'd have to expect a 1/5 probability of existential disaster from other causes in the 2030-2050 period. (That way, with human-level AGI in 2050, you'd have a 1/2 * 4/5 = 40% chance of surviving, just like with human-level AGI in 2030.) I don't really know of non-AI risks in the ballpark of 10% per decade.

(My guess at MIRI people's model is more like 99% chance of existential disaster from human-level AGI in 2030 and 90% in 2050, in which case indifference would require a 90% chance of some other existential disaster in 2030-2050, to cut 10% chance of survival down to 1%.)

"Safewashing" would be more directly parallel to "greenwashing" and sounds less awkward to my ears than "safetywashing", but on the other hand the relevant ideas are more often called "AI safety" than "safe AI", so I'm not sure if it's a better or worse term.

Yes, my experience of "nobody listened 20 years ago when the case for caring about AI risk was already overwhelmingly strong and urgent" doesn't put strong bounds on how much I should anticipate that people will care about AI risk in the future, and this is important; but it puts stronger bounds on how much I should anticipate that people will care about counterintuitive aspects of AI risk that haven't yet undergone a slow process of climbing in mainstream respectability, even if the case for caring about those aspects is overwhelmingly strong and urgent (except insofar as LessWrong culture has instilled a general appreciation for things that have overwhelmingly strong and urgent cases for caring about them), and this is also important.

  1. after a tech company singularity,

I think this was meant to read "2. after AGI,"

Note that the full 2021 MIRI conversations are also available (in robot voice) in the Nonlinear Library archive.

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