My reading is that the crux of the argument here is: causality implies no free will in twin PD, so equally, free will implies no causality; therefore, we can use our free will to break causality. The relevant quote:
because only one of (a) or (b) is compatible with the past/the physical laws, and because you are free to choose (a) or (b), it turns out that in some sense, you’re free to choose the past/the physical laws (or, their computational analogs).
To me, Occam's razor prefers no-free-will to causality-breaking. Granted, causality is as mysterious as free will. But causality is more fundamental, more basic — it exists in non-agent systems too. Free will, on the other hand, privileges agents, as if there's something metaphysical about them.
By the way, the causality view is still consistent with one-boxing. I go with causality.
Indeed.
My reading is that the crux of the argument here is: causality implies no free will in twin PD, so equally, free will implies no causality; therefore, we can use our free will to break causality. The relevant quote:
To me, Occam's razor prefers no-free-will to causality-breaking. Granted, causality is as mysterious as free will. But causality is more fundamental, more basic — it exists in non-agent systems too. Free will, on the other hand, privileges agents, as if there's something metaphysical about them.
By the way, the causality view is still consistent with one-boxing. I go with causality.