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Open Thread: February 2010

Sadly, we seem to make no progress in any direction. Thanks for trying.

Open Thread: February 2010

What do you mean? It could have created and run a copy, for instance, but anyhow, there would be no causal link. That's probably the whole point of the 2-Boxer-majority.

I can see a rationale behind one-boxing, and it might even be a standoff, but why almost no one here seems to see the point of 2-boxing, and the amazing overconfidence is beyond me.

Open Thread: February 2010

I mean, the actual token, the action, the choice, the act of my choosing does not determine the contents. It's Omega's belief (however obtained) that this algorithm is such-and-such that lead it to fill the boxes accordingly.

Open Thread: February 2010

Is it not rather Omega's undisclosed method that determines the contens? That seems to make all the difference.

Open Thread: February 2010

You have the same choice as me: Take one box or both. (Or, if you assume there are no choices in this possible world because of determinism: It would be rational to 2-box, because I, the thief, do 2-box, and my strategy is dominant)

Open Thread: February 2010

You've mentioned 'backwards causality' which isn't assumed in our one-box solution to Newcomb.

Only to rule it out as a solution. No problem here.

How comfortable are you with the assumption of determinism?

In general, very. Concerning Newcomb, I don't think it's essential, and as far as I recall, it isn't mentioned in the orginal problem.

you need to tell me where you think logical and winning diverge

I'll try again: I think you can show with simple counterexamples that winning is neither necessary nor sufficient for being logical (your term for my rational, if I understand you correctly).

Here we go: it's not necessary, because you can be unlucky. Your strategy might be best, but you might lose as soon as luck is involved. It's not sufficient, because you can be lucky. You can win a game even if you're not perfectly rational.

1-boxing seems a variant of the second case, instead of (bad) luck the game is rigged.

Open Thread: February 2010

So what is your point? That no backwards causation is involved is assumed in both cases. If this scenario is for dialectic purposes, it fails: It is equally clear, if not clearer, that my actual choice has no effect on the content of the boxes.

For what it's worth, let me reply with my own story:

Omega puts the two boxes in front of you, and says the usual. Just as you’re about to pick, I come along, grab both boxes, and run. I do this every time Omega confronts someone with his boxes, and I always do as good as a two-boxer and better than a one-boxer. You have the same choice as me: Just two-box. Why won’t you?

Open Thread: February 2010

so the best way to make sure the one box has the goodies in it is to plan to actually take only that box.

If we rule out backwards causation, then why on earth should this be true???

Open Thread: February 2010

May I suggest again that defining rational as winning may be the problem?

Open Thread: February 2010

I never said I could add anything new to the discussion. The problem is: judging by the comments so far, nobody here can, either. And since most experts outside this community agree on 2-boxing (ore am I wrong about this?), my original question stands.

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