Thanks! Will check them out.
Yep, I have already included this in my post itself.
The point of the third assumption is that those revival simulations are not just similar to you, but actually "you". "You" of this instant is a particular observer-moment that is being computed in a multitude of quantum branches or universes.
I believe this point has been made by others, that QI should be considered horrifying rather than an escape from death.
I agree, though this misses the point since I never rendered a value judgment on whether being immortal this way is "good" or "bad". I was simply stating a neutral argument as to why we are probably immortal if we accept the three assumptions I laid out.
See the argument for quantum immortality, mine is similar to that but involves revival simulations in other worlds rather than just future branches.
Will do, have heard great things about it!
The same way one "should expect" to wake up from sleep the next morning. "You" of this instant is a particular observer-moment that is being computed in a multitude of quantum branches or universes. Here the argument is that when you die, there will be quantum branches or other universes computing observer-moments of you being revived, and hence you are guaranteed to be "revived" after death from a subjective point of view.
Could you elaborate on the ground truth part? I'm not sure I understand.
Epistemic Status: ~70% confidence, hoping to get some feedback.
I'm going to argue that if we accept three controversial (but not outlandish) assumptions to be true, then subjective death (the cessation of conscious experiences identifying themselves as "you") is impossible. I will keep this post as concise as possible.
Here are the three assumptions:
Given assumption 1, somewhere "out there" (e.g. in a different Everett branch), there will be worlds that contain "revival simulations" of you (simulations of you being revived and regaining consciousness after your death).
Given assumption 2, these simulations will be... (read more)
Yea I'm not really trying to make any action-relevant point, just pointing out that if we accept three premises which are not that uncommonly held here on LessWrong we get something weird. Also if anything this makes me more scared of death since I would have no idea or control of how I am "respawned" and by whom.
And FWIW I'm skeptical of the reduced measure response to quantum immortality, it feels like cope to me. I don't intuitively see why I should not care about my anticipated experiences more than some mathematical construct.