I find it interesting that Less Wrong appears to be rediscovering existing ethical theories.
This article argues for a form of virtue ethics arising from utilitarianism - in order to be a good person, simulate an alternate self free of whatever desire is applicable, and then use them as a moral exemplar.
Similarly, Elizer's arguments for Coherent Extrapolated Volition in FAI bear a striking resemblance to Rousseau's arguments regarding the collective will of a state.
Another example of this that springs to mind is this less-popular post on beeminding sin. ... (read more)
I find it interesting that Less Wrong appears to be rediscovering existing ethical theories.
This article argues for a form of virtue ethics arising from utilitarianism - in order to be a good person, simulate an alternate self free of whatever desire is applicable, and then use them as a moral exemplar.
Similarly, Elizer's arguments for Coherent Extrapolated Volition in FAI bear a striking resemblance to Rousseau's arguments regarding the collective will of a state.
Another example of this that springs to mind is this less-popular post on beeminding sin. ... (read more)