This is more of a summary or paraphrase than a review, really. The Importance of What We Care About is 13 essays by philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt. These are my one-paragraph summaries of each:

If you do something because you willed yourself to do it, you are responsible for having done it, even if you could not in fact have done otherwise. The fact that your action was done under coercive threat or that it was predetermined does not absolve you of responsibility for it if the actual reason you took the action is because you intended to. For you to be blamable/creditable for some action does not require that you could potentially have done something else, contrary to centuries of previous theorizing about ethics.
A perhaps defining property of “persons” is that we can form “second-order volitions”: desires about our desires. Because a person may wish that her will were directed toward wishes other than her current wishes, it is for persons that questions of “free will” arise: do I have the ability to choose my own wishes, or do I merely have the ability to work toward the fulfillment of whatever unchosen wish currently predominates?
Threats and offers are two ways that one person may try to influence someone to exercise his will in a particular way. For either of these to rise to the level of “coercion,” or at any rate, “compulsion” — in a sense that absolves the person coerced of moral responsibility for the resulting action — it must go beyond merely influencing his will and become more like imposing one’s own will upon him.
Doing something because it is the lesser of available evils, and therefore something one would rather not have to do, is still to do it freely and responsibly. Though being responsible for doing the lesser of available evils doesn’t necessarily make you blameworthy for the evil. If indeed it was the lesser of available evils, that is enough to deflect the blame.
Things we do may be active (actions) or passive (mere happenings). “Passions” (e.g. anger) also may be active or passive in this way: some passions we own as part of our persons (they are “internal”), others take hold of us without our consent (“external”). A person may externalize a passion by rejecting it or refusing to cooperate with it or even by submitting unwillingly to it, or can internalize one by agreeing with it, going along with it, incorporating it into one’s self image.

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Blame Avoidance