I found Yarrow Bouchard's quick take on the EA Forum regarding LessWrong's performance in the COVID-19 pandemic quite good.
I don't trust her to do such an analysis in an unbiased way [[1]] , but the quick take was pretty full of empirical investigation that made me change my mind wrt to how well LessWrong in particular did.
There's much more historiography to be done here, who believed what, when, what the long-term effects of COVID-19 are, which interventions did what, but this seems like the state of the art on "how well did LessWrong actually p...
About once every 15 minutes, someone tweets "you can just do things". It seems like a rather powerful and empowering meme and I was curious where it came from, so I did some research into its origins. Although I'm not very satisfied with what I was able to reconstruct, here are some of the things that I found:
In 1995, Steve Jobs gives the following quote in an interview:
...Life can be much broader, once you discover one simple fact, and that is that everything around you that you call life was made up by people that w
Gpt5.2 seems to have been trained specifically to be better at work tasks, especially long ones. It was also released early, according to articles about a "code red" in openAI. As such, (I predict) it should be a jump on the metr graph. It will be difficult to differentiate progress because it was trained to do well at long work tasks from the results of the early release and from any actual algorithms progress. (An example of algorithms progress would be a training method for using memory well - something not specific to eg programming tasks.)
Here is the graph I'm talking about. Given that 5.1-codex max is already above the trend line, a jump would be a point outside the shaded area, that is bucking the de facto trend.
Rationalists often say "insane" to talk about normie behaviors they don't like, and "sane" to talk about behaviors they like better. This seems unnecessarily confusing and mean to me.
This clearly is very different from how most people use these words. Like, "guy who believes in God" is very different from "resident of a psych ward." It can even cause legitimate confusion when you want to switch back to the traditional definition of "insane". This doesn't seem very rational to me!
Also, the otherizing/dismissiv...
I think there's some bad knock-on effects for normalizing the use of "insane" to talk about very common features of the world: I think it makes social-rationalists to willing to disparage people and institutions, as part of a status-signaling game, often without much careful thought.
But I think there's also something valuable about eg. calling belief in God "insane". There's a kind of willingness to call a spade a spade, and not back away from how the literal stated beliefs, if they were not pervasive, would in fact be regarded as signs of insanity.
[Fiction]
A novice needed a map of the northern mountain passes. He approached the temple cartographer.
"Draw me the northern passes," he said, "showing the paths, the fords, and the shelters."
The cartographer studied many sources and produced a map. The novice examined it carefully: the mountains were drawn, the paths clearly traced, fords and shelters marked in their proper notation. The distances seemed reasonable. The penmanship was excellent.
"This is good work," said the novice, and he led a merchant caravan into the mountains.
On the third night, they r...
Flagging this one as worth re-reading if you don't catch it. Took me three rounds (first was admittedly skimming)
Dopamine might be what regulates top-down, "will-imposing" action.
Stimulants are great for increasing attention, motivation and mood. However, they also cause downregulation of dopamine receptors, thus potentially causing dependence and the opposite of the benefits when not taking them.
Some lesser-known ways to upregulate the dopaminergic system without (or with less of) this effect:
I agree that in general, downregulation is to be expected, but it doesn't always happen (depending on the specific receptor, affinity for their presynaptic counterpart, or biased agonism).
E.g.
OpenAI claims 5.2 solved an open COLT problem with no assistance: https://openai.com/index/gpt-5-2-for-science-and-math/
This might be the first thing that meets my bar of autonomously having an original insight??
I mean, I think so. In those papers it's often not clear how "elicited" that key step was. The advantage of this example is that it very clearly claims the researchers made no contribution whatsoever, and the result still seems to settle a problem someone cares about! Only caveat is that it comes from OpenAI, who has a very strong incentive to drive the hype-cycle about their own models (but on the other hand, also has access to some of the best models which are not publicly available yet, which lends credibility).
One theme I've been thinking about recently is how bids for connection and understanding are often read as criticism. For example:
Person A shares a new idea, feeling excited and hoping to connect with Person B over something they've worked hard on and hold dear.
Person B asks a question about a perceived inconsistency in the idea, feeling excited and hoping for an answer which helps them better understand the idea (and Person B).
Person A feels hurt and unfairly rejected by Person B. Specifically, Person A feels like Person B isn't willing to give their sinc...
I find it bizarre and surprising, no matter how often it happens, when someone thinks my helping them pressure-test their ideas and beliefs for consistency is anything except a deep engagement and joy. If I didn't want to connect and understand them, I wouldn't bother actually engaging with the idea.
I feel like I could have written this (and the rest of your comment)! It's confusing and deflating when deep engagement and joy aren't recognized as such.
...It's happened often enough that I often need to modulate my enthusiasm, as it does cause suffe
Someone on the EA forum asked why I've updated away from public outreach as a valuable strategy. My response:
I used to not actually believe in heavy-tailed impact. On some gut level I thought that early rationalists (and to a lesser extent EAs) had "gotten lucky" in being way more right than academic consensus about AI progress. I also implicitly believed that e.g. Thiel and Musk and so on kept getting lucky, because I didn't want to picture a world in which they were actually just skillful enough to keep succeeding (due to various psychological blockers)....
Chaitin was quite young when he (co-)invented AIT.
RL capability gains might mostly come from better self-elicitation.
Ran across a paper NUDGING: Inference-time Alignment of LLMs via Guided Decoding. The authors took a base model and a post-trained model. They had the base model try to answer benchmark questions, found the positions where the base model was least certain, and replaced specifically those tokens with tokens from the post-trained model. The base model, so steered, performed surprisingly well on benchmarks. Surprisingly (to me at least), the tokens changed tended to be transitional phrases rat...
The way they use the word "aligned" in that paper is very weird to me :P (they basically use it as a synonym for "instruction-following" or "post-trained").
But I feel like this method could actually be adapted for AI alignment/safety. It's kind of similar to my "incremental steering" idea, but instead of a strong untrusted model guiding a weak trusted model, there's a weak post-trained model guiding a strong base model. This also looks more practical than incremental steering, because it alternates between the weak model and the strong model, rather than g...
Superstable proteins: A team from Nanjing University just created a protein that's 5x stronger against unfolding than normal proteins and can withstand temperatures of 150C. The upshot from some analysis on X seems to be:
So why is this relevant? It's basically the first step to...
Yeah the paper seems more like a material science paper than a biology paper. There was no test/simulations/discussion about biological function; similar to DNA computing/data storage, it's mostly interested in the properties of the material than how it interfaces with pre-existing biology.
They did optimize for foldability, and did successfully produce the folded protein in (standard bacterial) cells. So it can be produced by biological systems (at least briefly), and more complex proteins had lower yields.
Their application they looked at was hydrogels, and it seems to have improved performance there? But functioning in biological systems introduces more constraints.
For decades, people have been saying that the prediction market has the potential to become economically important, yet it remains unimportant. I would not be surprised if it becomes important over the next 4 years thanks to broadly-available AI technology.
Let's define "economically important" as a state of affairs in which there continues to be at least $50 billion riding on predictions at every instant in time.
First of all, AI tech might make prediction markets better by helping with market-making and arbitrage. Second, a sufficiently robust prediction m...
Maybe I failed to write something that reasonable people could parse.
Notes to self about the structure of the problem, probably not interesting to others:
This is heavily drawn from MIRIs work and Joe Carlsmith's work
So, there are two kinds of value structure: (1) Long-term goals, and (2) immediate goals & deontological constraints. The line between them isn't sharp but that's OK.
If we imagine an agent that only has long-term goals, well, that thing is going to be a ruthless consequentialisty optimizer thingy and when it gets smart and powerful enough it'll totally take over the world if it can, unless the maxima of its ...
More reasons to worry about relying on constraints:
Do we have some page containing resources for rationalist parents, or generally for parents of smart children? Such as recommended books, toys, learning apps, etc.
I found tag https://www.lesswrong.com/w/parenting but I was hoping for some kind of best textbooks / recommendations / reference works but for parents/children.
I'm not arguing either way. I just note this specific aspect that seems relevant. The question is: Is the babies body more susceptible to alcohol than an adults body. For example, does the liver work better or worse than for a baby? Are there developmental processes that can be disturbed by the presence of alcohol? By default I'd assume that the effect is proportional (except maybe the baby "lives faster" in some sense, so the effect may be proportional to metabilism or growth speed or something). But all of that is speculation.
For the last week ChatGPT 5.1 is glitching.
*It claims to be 5.1, I do not know how to check it, since I use free version (limited questions per day), and there is no version selection.
When I ask it to explain some topic and ask deeper and deeper questions, at some point it chooses to enter the thinking mode. I see that the topics it thinks about are relevant, but as it stops thinking it and says something similar "Ah, Great, here is the answer..." and explains another topic from like 2-3 messages back, which is already not related to the question.
I do not use memory or characters features.
In simple chat conversations, where i want it to generate a javascript line of code, it gets stupid. But in other chats, where i raise more difficult topics and thus i explain more than ask, it seems to be quite smart.
Am I understanding correctly that recent revelations from Ilya's deposition (e.g. looking at the parts here) suggest Ilya Sutskever and Mira Murati seem like very selfish and/or cowardly people? They seem approximately as scheming or manipulative as Sam Altman, if maybe more cowardly and less competent.
My understanding from is that they were basically wholly responsible for causing the board to try to fire Sam Altman. But when it went south, they actively sabotaged the firing (e.g. Mira disavowing it and trying to retain her role, Ilya saying he regr...
Make sure the people on the board of OpenAI were not catastrophically naive about corporate politics and public relations? Or, make sure they understand their naïveté well enough to get professional advice beforehand? I just reread the press release and can still barely believe how badly they effed it up.
Do LLMs have intelligence (mind), or are they only rational agents? To understand this question, I think it is important to delineate the subtle difference between intelligence and rationality.
In current practice of building artificial intelligence, the most common approach is the standard model, which refers to building rationally acting agents—those that strive to accomplish some objective put into them (see “Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach” by Russell and Norvig). These agents, built according to the standard model, use an external standard f...
Many have asserted that LLM pre-training on human data can only produce human-level capabilities at most. Others, eg Ilya Sutskever and Eliezer Yudkowsky, point out that since prediction is harder than generation, there's no reason to expect such a cap.
The latter position seems clearly correct to me, but I'm not aware of it having been tested. It seems like it shouldn't be that hard to test, using some narrow synthetic domain.
The only superhuman capability of LLMs that's been clearly shown as far as I know is their central one: next-token prediction. But I...
LLMs are of course also superhuman at knowing lots of facts, but that's unlikely to impress anyone since it was true of databases by the early 1970s.
Epistemic status: I think that there are serious problems with honesty passwords (as discussed in this post), and am not sure that there are any circumstances in which we'd actually want to use them. Furthermore, I was not able to come up with a practical scheme for honesty passwords with ~2 days of effort. However, there might be some interesting ideas in this post, and maybe they could turn into something useful at some later point.
...Thanks to Alexa Pan, Buck Shlegeris, Ryan Greenblatt, Vivek Hebbar and Nathan Sheffield for discussions that led to me writi
Fine-tuning induced confidence is a concerning possibility that I hadn't thought of. idk how scared to be of it. Thanks!