One possibility is that our intuitive sense of 'is this statement likely to be true' is developed to detect lies by other human beings, rather than to simulate the external world.
For example if someone is trying to convince you of a tribe members bad behaviour, the ability to produce extra details (time/location/etc) makes it more plausible they are truthful rather than lying. However in probability terms each extra detail makes it less likely (e.g. 'probability of bad behaviour' 'probability of doing it in location x etc).
[Cross-posted in the original thread]
Today's post, Burdensome Details was originally published on 20 September 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
If you want to avoid the conjunction fallacy, you must try to feel a stronger emotional impact from Occam's Razor. Each additional detail added to a claim must feel as though it is driving the probability of the claim down towards zero.
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
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