This type of procedure may look inelegant for folks who expect population ethics to have an objectively correct solution. However, I think it's confused to expect there to be such an objective solution. In my view at least, this makes the procedure described in the original post look pretty attractive as a way to move forward.
Because it includes some very similar considerations as are presented in the original post here, I'll try to (for those who are curious enough to bear with me) describe the framework I've been using for thinking about population ethics:
(While the first principle is about which minds to create, the second two principles apply to how to create new minds.)
uh… I guess cannot get around the regress involved in claiming my moral values superior to competing systems in an objective sense?
It looks like some people can, since the attitudes of professional philosophers break down as:
I can see how the conclusion would be difficult to reach if you make assumptions that are standard round here, such as
Morality is value
Morality is only value
All value is moral value.
But I suppose other people are making other assumptions.
Perhap... (read more)
There has been a long standing debate between utilitarians about what should be maximized. Most fall on either the side of ‘average utility’ or ‘total utility’. A select group even chooses ‘minimum utility’ or other lesser known methods.
Previously I have tried to solve this by charting different moral-theories on different axis and by prioritizing those actions that achieve success in most moral theories (see Q-balance utilitarianism).
I have come to the conclusion that this is just a bandaid on a more fundamental problem. Whether we should choose total, average or even median utility isn’t something we could objectively decide. So I suggest that we go up one level, and maximize what most people want to maximize.
Let’s say we were able to gauge everyone’s (underlying) preferences about how much they like certain methods of maximizing by holding a so called utilitarian vote.
A utilitarian method that would violate your preferences completely would get a score of 0, one that would encapsulate your preferences perfectly would get a score of 1 and one that you like to a certain extent but not completely gets e.g 0,732.
If there is such a thing as ‘meta-preference ambivalence’ we could gauge that too: “People who do not have any meta-preferences in their utility-function get a score of 0, people for whom the entire purpose in life is the promotion of average utilitarianism will get a score of 1 etc.
Just multiply the ambivalence with the meta-preference and then add all the scores of the individual methods together (add all the scores of the preferences for “median utility” together, add all the scores for “total utility” together etc) and compare.
Now one way of maximizing comes out on top, but should we pursue it absolutely or proportionally? If “total utilitarianism” wins with 70% and “average utilitarianism” loses with 30% of the vote, should we act as “total utilitarians” 100% of the time or 70% of the time? (with average utilitarianism 30% of the time at random intervals)
Well, we could solve that with a vote too: “Would you prefer pursuing the winning method 100% of the time or would you prefer pursuing it proportionally to it’s victory?”
And any other problem we’ll face after this will be decided by comparing people’s preferences about those problems as well. (This might, depending on how you interpret it, also solve the negative-positive utilitarianism debate)
This might be encroaching on contractualism, but I think this is a very elegant way to solve some of the meta-level disagreements in utilitarian philosophy.