"it" isn't a single theory.

The argument that Everettian MW is favoured by Solomonoff induction, is flawed.

If the program running the SWE outputs information about all worlds on a single output tape, they are going to have to be concatenated or interleaved somehow. Which means that to make use of the information, you gave to identify the subset of bits relating to your world. That's extra complexity which isn't accounted for because it's being done by hand, as it were..

By far the best definition I’ve ever heard of the supernatural is Richard Carrier’s: A “supernatural” explanation appeals to ontologically basic mental things, mental entities that cannot be reduced to nonmental entities.

Physicalism, materialism, empiricism, and reductionism are clearly similar ideas, but not identical. Carrier's criterion captures something about a supernatural ontology, but nothing about supernatural epistemology. Surely the central claim of natural epistemology is that you have to look...you can't rely on faith , or clear ideas implanted in our minds by God.

it seems that we have very good grounds for excluding supernatural explanations a priori

But making reductionism aprioristic arguably makes it less scientific...at least, what you gain in scientific ontology, you lose in scientific epistemology.

I mean, what would the universe look like if reductionism were false

We wouldn't have reductive explanations of some apparently high level phenomena ... Which we don't.

I previously defined the reductionist thesis as follows: human minds create multi-level models of reality in which high-level patterns and low-level patterns are separately and explicitly represented. A physicist knows Newton’s equation for gravity, Einstein’s equation for gravity, and the derivation of the former as a low-speed approximation of the latter. But these three separate mental representations, are only a convenience of human cognition. It is not that reality itself has an Einstein equation that governs at high speeds, a Newton equation that governs at low speeds, and a “bridging law” that smooths the interface. Reality itself has only a single level, Einsteinian gravity. It is only the Mind Projection Fallacy that makes some people talk as if the higher levels could have a separate existence—different levels of organization can have separate representations in human maps, but the territory itself is a single unified low-level mathematical object. Suppose this were wrong.

Suppose that the Mind Projection Fallacy was not a fallacy, but simply true.

Note that there are four possibilities here...

1. I assume a one level universe, all further details are correct.

2. I assume a one level universe, some details may be incorrect

3. I assume a multi level universe, all further details are correct.

4. I assume a multi level universe, some details may be incorrect.

How do we know that the MPF is actually fallacious, and what does it mean anyway?

If all forms of mind projection projection are wrong, then reductive physicalism is wrong, because quarks, or whatever is ultimately real, should not be mind projected, either.

If no higher level concept should be mind projected, then reducible higher level concepts shouldn't be ...which is not EY's intention.

Well, maybe irreducible high level concepts are the ones that shouldn't be mind projected.

That certainly amounts to disbelieving in non reductionism...but it doesn't have much to do with mind projection. If some examples of mind projection are acceptable , and the unacceptable ones coincide with the ones forbidden by reductivism, then MPF is being used as a Trojan horse for reductionism.

And if reductionism is an obvious truth , it could have stood on its own as apriori truth.

Suppose that a 747 had a fundamental physical existence apart from the quarks making up the 747. What experimental observations would you expect to make, if you found yourself in such a universe?

Science isn't 100% observation,it's a mixture of observation and explanation.

A reductionist ontology is a one level universe: the evidence for it is the success of reductive explanation , the ability to explain higher level phenomena entirely in terms of lower level behaviour. And the existence of explanations is aposteriori, without being observational data, in the usual sense. Explanations are abductive,not inductive or deductive.

As before, you should expect to be able to make reductive explanations of all high level phenomena in a one level universe....if you are sufficiently intelligent. It's like the Laplace's Demon illustration of determinism,only "vertical". If you find yourself unable to make reductive explanations of all phenomena, that might be because you lack the intelligence , or because you are in a non reductive multi level universe or because you haven't had enough time...

Either way, it's doubtful and aposteriori, not certain and apriori.

If you can’t come up with a good answer to that, it’s not observation that’s ruling out “non-reductionist” beliefs, but a priori logical incoherence"

I think I have answered that. I don't need observations to rule it out. Observations-rule it-in, and incoherence-rules-it-out aren't the only options.

People who live in reductionist universes cannot concretely envision non-reductionist universes.

Which is a funny thing to say, since science was non-reductionist till about 100 years ago.

One of the clinching arguments for reductionism.was the Schrödinger equation, which showed that in principle, the whole of chemistry is reducible to physics, while the rise of milecular biology showeds th rreducxibility of Before that, educators would point to the de facto hierarchy of the sciences -- physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology -- as evidence of a multi-layer reality.

Unless the point is about "concretely". What does it mean to concretely envision a reductionist universe? Pehaps it means you imagine all the prima facie layers, and also reductive explanations linking them. But then the non-reductionist universe would require less envisioning, because byit's the same thing without the bridging explanations! Or maybe it means just envisioing huge arrays of quarks. Which you can't do. The reductionist world view , in combination with the limitations of the brain, implies that you pretty much have to use higher level, summarised concepts...and that they are not necessarily wrong.

But now we get to the dilemma: if the staid conventional normal boring understanding of physics and the brain is correct, there’s no way in principle that a human being can concretely envision, and derive testable experimental predictions about, an alternate universe in which things are irreducibly mental. Because, if the boring old normal model is correct, your brain is made of quarks, and so your brain will only be able to envision and concretely predict things that can predicted by quarks.

1. "Your brain is made of quarks" is aposteriori, not apriori.

2. Your brain being made of quarks doesn't imply anything about computability. In fact, the computatbolity of the ultimately correct version of quantum physics is an open question.

3. Incomputability isn't the only thing that implies irreducibility, as @ChronoDas points out.

4. Non reductionism is conceivable, or there would be no need to argue for reductionism.

.

The Olson twins are do not at all have qualitative identity.

Not 100% , but enough to illustrate the concept.

So I just don’t know what your position is.

I didn't have to have a solution to point out the flaws in other solutions. My main point is that a no to soul- theory isn't a yes to computationalism. Computationalism isn't the only alternative, or the best.

You claim that there doesn’t need to be an answer;

Some problems are insoluble.

that seems false, as you could have to make decisions informed by your belief.

My belief isn't necessarily the actually really answer ..is it? That's basic rationality. You need beliefs to act...but beliefs aren't necessarily true.

And I have no practical need for a theory that can answer puzzles about destructive teleportation and the like.

You currently value your future self more than other people, so you act like you believe that’s you in a functional sense.

Yes. That's not an argument in favour of the contentious points, like computationalism and Plural Is. If I try to reverse the logic, and great everything I value as me, I get bizarre results...I am my dog, country, etc.

Are you the same person tomorrow? It’s not an identical pattern, but a continuation.

Tomorrow-me is a physical continuation , too.

I’m saying it’s pretty-much you because the elements you wouldn’t want changed about yourself are there.

If I accept that pattern is all that matters , I have to face counterintuitive consequences like Plural I's.

If I accept that material continuity is all that matters, then I face other counterintuitive consequences, like having my connectome rewired.

Its an open philosophical problem. If there were an simple answer , it would have been answered long ago.

"Yer an algorithm, Arry" is a simple answer. Just not good

If you value your body or your continuity over the continuity of your memories, beliefs, values, and the rest of your mind that’s fine,

Fortunately, it's not an either-or choice.

I certainly do believe in the plural I (under the speciall cirrumstance I discussed); we must be understanding something differently in the torture question. I don’t have a preference pre-copy for who gets tortured; both identical future copies are me from my perspective before copying. Maybe you’re agreeing with that?

...and post copy I have a preference for the copy who isn't me to be tortured. Which is to say that both copies say the same thing, which is to say that they are only copies. If they regarded themselves as numerically identical, the response "the other one!" would make no sense, and nor would the question. The questions presumes a lack of numerical identity, so how can it prove it?

I was addressing a perfect computational copy. An imperfect but good computational copy is higher resolution, not lower, than a biological twin. It is orders of magnitude more similar to the pattern that makes your mind, even though it is less similar to the pattern that makes your body.

You're assuming pattern continuity matters more than material continuity. There's no proof of that, and no proof that you have to make an either-or choice.

What is writing your words is your mind, not your body, so when it says “I” it meets the mind.

The abstract pattern can't cause anything without the brain/body.

Noncomputational physicalism sounds like it’s just confused. Physics performs computations and can’t be separated from doing that.

Noncomputational physicalism isn't the claim that computation never occurs. Its the claim that the computational abstraction doesn't capture everything that's relevant to consciousness/mind. Its not physically necessary that the computational abstraction captures all the causally relevant information, so it isn't logically necessary, a fortiori.

Dual aspect theory is incoherent because you can’t have our physics without doing computation that can create a being that claims and experiences consciousness like we do.

Computation is a lossy , high level abstraction of a what a physical system does. It doesn't fundamentally cause anything in itself.

Now, you can argue that a physical duplicate would make the same claims to be conscious without actually having consciousness, and that's literally a p-zombie argument.

But we do have consciousness. The insight of DAT is that "reports of consciousness have a physical/computational basis" isn't exclusive of "reports of consciousness are caused by consciousness". You can have your cake and eat it!

Of course, the above is all about consciousness-qua-awareness , not consciousness qua personal identity.

I concede it’s possible that consciousness includes some magic nonphysical component (that’s not computation or pattern instantiated by physics as a pure result of how physics works).

If it's physical, why call it magical?

It's completely standard that all computations run on a substrate. If you want to say that all physics is computation, OK, but then all computation is physics. You then no longer have plural I's, because physics doesn't allow the selfsame object to have multiple instances.

Do you think a successful upload would say things like “I’m still me!” and think thoughts like “I’m so glad I payed extra to give myself cool virtual environment options”? That seems like an inevitability if the causal patterns of your mind were captured. And it would be tough to disagree with a thing claiming up and down it’s you, citing your most personal memories as evidence

It's easy to disagree if there is another explanation, which there is: a functional duplicate will behave the same, because it's a functional duplicate..whether it's conscious of not, whether it's you or not.

You’ve got a lot of questions to raise, but no apparent alternative.

Non computationalism physicalism is an alternative to either or both the computationalist theories. (That performing a certain class of computations is sufficient to be conscious in general, or that performing a specific one is sufficient to be a particular conscious individual. Computation as a theory of consciousness qua awareness isn't known to be true, and even if it is assumed, it doesn't directly give you a theory of personal identity).

The non existence, or incoherence, of personal identity is another. There doesn't have to be an answer to "when is a mind me".

Note that no one except andeslodes is arguing against copying. The issue is when a mind is me, the person typing this, not a copy-of-me.

Reproduce the matter, you’ve reproduced the mind.

Well, that's only copying.

Consciousness, qua Awareness, and Personal Identity are easily confused, not least because both are often called "consciousness".

A computational theory of consciousness is sometimes called on to solve the second problem, the problem of personal identity. But there is no strong reason to think a computational duplicate of you, actually is you, since there is no strong reason to think any other kind of duplicate is.

Qualitative identity is a relationship between two or more things that are identical in all their properties. Numerical identity is the relationship a thing has only to itself. The Olsen twins enjoy qualitative identity; Stephanie Germanota and Lady Gaga have numerical identity. The trick is to jump from qualitative identity to numerical identity, because the claim is that a computational duplicate of you, is you, the very same person.

Suppose you found out you had an identical twin. You would not consider them to be you yourself. Likewise for a biological clone. A computational duplicate would be lower resolution still, so why would it be you? The major problem is that you and your duplicate exist simultaneously in different places, which goes against the intuition that you are a unique individual.

You’re fighting against the counterintuitive conclusion. Sure I’d rather have a different version of me be tortured; it’s slightly different. But I won’t be happy about it. And my intuition is still drawn toward continuity being important, even though my whole rational mind disagrees. I’ve been back and forth over this extensively, and the conclusion is always the same- ever since I got over the counter-intuitive nature of the plural I

You don't really believe in the plural I theory, or you would have a different and we to the torture question.

Non -computationalist physicalism doesn't have to be the claim that material continuity matters , and pattern doesnt: it can be the claim that both do. So that you cease to be you if you are destructively cloned, and also if your mind is badly scrambled. No bullet biting about plural Is is required.

Both determinism and free will are metaphysical assumptions. In other words, they are presuppositions of thought.

Neither is a presupposition of thought. You don't have to presume free will, beyond some general decision making ability, and you don't have to presume strict determinism beyond some good-enough causal reliability. Moreover, both are potentially discoverable as facts.

A choice must be determined by your mental processes, knowledge and desires. If choices arose out of nowhere, as uncaused causes, they would not be choices.

False dichotomy. A choice can be influenced by your mental processes, knowledge and desires without being determined by them.

A choice is not an uncaused cause. A choice is when thought generates an intention, based on pre-existing preferences and knowledge, and that intention generates action toward making the intention real.

You can't assume that any kind of choice counts as free will.

Free will is not “free” in the sense of being uncaused. It is “free” in the sense that you are the cause

I see determinism, you are not the cause, only a cause. The choice you made was already a fact before you were born.

. If an uncaused cause arose out of nowhere and made you pick the chocolate, that would not be a choice. It would be a strange, supernatural event.

Indeterminism based free will doesn't have to separate you from your own desires, values, and goals, because, realistically ,they are often conflicting , so that they don't determine a single action. This point is explained by the parable of the cake. If I am offered a slice of cake, I might want to take it so as not to refuse my hostess, but also to refuse it so as to stick to my diet. Whichever action I chose, would have been supported by a reason. Reasons and actions can be chosen in pairs.

. By contrast, I am free to make a cup of coffee right now, because I have the power to turn that intention into a reality.

That's only freedom in the compatibilists sense.

Determinism is a presupposition of science

No, much of science is statistical and probablistic.

The free will | determinism paradox is one of a family of paradoxes created by thinking about the self as an object.

Determinism excludes libertarian free will by removing the ability to have done otherwise: you have offered nothing to restore it.

None of these are free will (as commonly understood

Some believe that free will must be a tertium datur, a third thing fundamentally different to both determinism and indeterminism. This argument has the advantage that it makes free will logically impossible,and the disadvantage that hardly any who believes in free will defined it that way. In particular, naturalistic libertarians are happy to base free will on a mere mixture of determinism and indeterminism.

Another concern about naturalistic libertarianism is that determinism is needed to put a decision into effect once it had been made. If one's actions are unrelated to ones decisions, one would certainly lack control in a relevant sense. But it is not the case that we are able to get the required results 100% of the time, so full determinism is perhaps unnecessary to achieve a realistic, "good enough" level of control. Additionally, there does not have to be the same amount of indeterminism at every stage of the deciding-and-acting process. In "two stage" models, the agent alternates between going into a more indeterministic mode to make the "coin toss" , and then into a more deterministic mode to implement it.

If you made choices (or some element of them) not controlled by your personality, experience, thoughts and anything else that comes under the heading of ‘the state of your brain as a result of genetics and your prior environments’, they would be random, which still isn’t free will

Because of the stipulative definition? Such choices can still relate to onesaims., values personality , and history.

And that is precisely why they are determined. They are determined by you

If they are determined by me and nothing else, that would be something like free will...but it's not pure determinism, because pure determinism means everything is inevitable from the dawn of time , including my decisions. It is something you can get from a two stage theory, though.

everything seems to collapse to tautology

Successful explanation makes things seem less arbitrary, more predictable, more obvious. A tautology is the ultimate in non arbitrary obviousness.

You are using "The criminal justice system" to mean " The US criminal justice system " throughout. Typical-countrying is particularly problematic in this case, because the US is such an outlier.

The way to humanize a prison system is not to replace unofficial tortures with official ones. Other countries have abandoned capital and corporal punishment , and have lower incarceration rates.

If the death penalty is not so bad, why does almost everyone on death row seek to appeal it?

I wonder what MIRI thinks about this 2013 post (“The genie knows, but doesn’t care”) nowadays. Seems like the argument is less persuasive now,

The genie argument was flawed at the time, for reasons pointed out at the time, and ignored at the time.