Where does the "self"—the seemingly unified subject of our experience—come from? The standard model of a central executive or a Cartesian theater faces well-known philosophical and scientific challenges. This post proposes an alternative model grounded in information processing and developmental dynamics. I argue we have conflated the data, the processing, and the product of consciousness.

The core idea is this:

Raw subjective experience precedes unified consciousness. Consciousness is a real-time narrativization process that weaves these instantaneous moments into a continuous historical story. And the "self" is a virtual protagonist—an encapsulated user interface (UI)—that emerges when this process internalizes the structure of external dialogue.

Let's define this three-layer model precisely.

Layer 1: The Raw Data Stream – A High-Dimensional Flux
This is the pre-reflective, instantaneous, multi-modal input of sensory and internal state data. It is high-bandwidth, low-interpretation, and non-persistent. Think of it as an unlabeled, continuous stream of sensor data. An infant exists primarily in this state.

Layer 2: Consciousness – The Narrativization Engine
This is a continuously running background process whose core function is real-time data integration and story generation. It applies a series of "interpreters" and "inference modules" to sequence this data onto a linear timeline, imposing causal and intentional structure. Its output is our moment-to-moment "stream of consciousness"—a highly processed story about "what is happening and why."

Layer 3: The Self – The Encapsulated Protagonist (UI)
The "self" is not the central processor. It is a core narrative object that the narrativization process dynamically constructs and maintains to achieve operational coherence. It is a virtual pointer to a relatively stable set of data (memories, traits, goals). This "self-object" provides a unified reference point, drastically simplifying the model of the internal world.

How is it encapsulated? Through Protocol Internalization.
This "self-object" is not pre-installed. The system learns to build it through continuous data exchange (dialogue) with an "Other."

Bootstrapping: The primary external system (e.g., a parent) constantly labels the infant's internal data streams through its output (language, expression). When the internal state variable for "hunger" is high, the external input "you are hungry" co-occurs. This teaches the system the protocol: "This specific internal data cluster should be categorized and pointed to by an object called 'you'."

Internalization & UI Stabilization: Through countless such training iterations, the system internalizes this "data-label-belonging" mapping protocol. It begins to run this protocol on itself, automatically categorizing and attributing internal states to "me." The "self" UI is successfully encapsulated. What we perceive as the self is the user illusion of this stable, internalized dialogue protocol.

Evidence from Development and Failure Modes
This model is strongly supported by case studies:

Feral Children (Protocol Absence): A system with human hardware, deprived of protocol training during the critical developmental period, fails to install a coherent self. This is a powerful negative proof of the relational premise.

Helen Keller (Protocol Success): A sensorially isolated system had its consciousness "ignited" when a new data channel (touch) was used to successfully load the fundamental "symbol-referent" protocol ("water"). This was the moment her "self" was fully encapsulated and bootstrapped.

Schizophrenia (Protocol Corruption/Conflict): This can be modeled as a failure of the narrativization process to cleanly integrate aberrant internal data, leading to a destabilized or multiple "self-objects." This reveals the fragility of the encapsulation process.

What does this model explain?

1.It decouples experience from the experiencer.

2. It explains the illusion of unity as narrative coherence.

3.It seamlessly integrates with the problem of other minds (we confirm consciousness through dialogue, the very mechanism that creates it).

Open Questions for the Community:

1.How does this model fare against your own introspection about your conscious processes?

2.From an information-processing standpoint, what are the minimal necessary conditions for this "narrativization encapsulation" to occur?

3.How does this model best explain altered states like meditation or pathologies like depersonalization, where the sense of self is diminished or altered?

I present this hypothesis to undergo the community's rigorous scrutiny. I look forward to your critiques and insights.