The informed oversight problem is a serious challenge for approval-directed agents (I recommend reading the post if you haven't already). Here is one approach to the problem that works by adding an entropy-maximization objective.

Let agent B be overseeing agent A. It seems that some of the problem is that A has many different possible strategies that B evaluates as good. Thus, A may choose among these good-looking strategies arbitrarily. If some of the good-looking strategies are actually bad, then A may choose one of these bad strategies.

This is not a problem if B's evaluation function $B(x,\cdot )$ has a single global maximum, and solutions significantly different from this one are necessarily rated as worse. It would be nice to have a general way of turning a problem with multiple global maxima into one with a unique global maximum.

Here's one attempt at going this. Given the original evaluation function $b$ mapping strings to reals, construct a new evaluation function $v$ mapping distributions over strings to reals. Specifically, for some other distribution of strings $f$ and a constant $\alpha >0$, define

$$v\left(d\right)=-\gamma D_{KL}\left(f||d\right)+E_{y\sim d}\left[b\right(y\left)\right]=\gamma H\left(d\right)+E_{y\sim d}\left[\gamma \log f\right(y)+b(y\left)\right]$$

where the equality holds because $D_{KL}\left(f||d\right)=H(d,f)-H\left(d\right)=-E_{y\sim d}\left[\log f\right(y\left)\right]-H\left(d\right)$. Observe that $v$ is strongly concave, so it has a single global maximum and no other local maxima. This global maximum is

$$d\left(y\right)\propto f\left(y\right)e^{b\left(y\right)/\gamma }$$

So the optimal solution to this problem is to choose a distribution that is somewhat similar to $f$ but overweights $y$ values with a high $b\left(y\right)$ value (with the rationality parameter $\gamma$ determining how much to overweight). The higher $\gamma$ is, the more strongly concave the problem is and the more $d$ will imitate $f$; the lower $\gamma$ is, the more this problem looks like the original $b$-maximization problem. This interpolation is similar to quantilization, but is somewhat different mathematically.

Intuitively, optimizing $v$ seems harder than optimizing $b$: the distribution $d$ must be able to provide all possible good solutions to $b$, rather than just one. But I think standard reinforcement learning algorithms can be adapted to optimize $v$. Really, you just need to optimize $H\left(d\right)+E_{y\sim d}\left[b\right(y\left)\right]$, for some $b$, since you can wrap the $\gamma \log f\left(y\right)$ and $b\left(y\right)$ terms together into a single function. So the agent must be able to maximize the sum of some original objective $b$ and the entropy of its own actions.

Consider Q-learning. An agent using Q-learning, in a given state $s$, will take the action $a$ that maximizes $Q(s,a)$, which is the expected total reward resulting from taking this action in this state (including utility from all future actions). Instead of choosing an action $a$ to maximize $Q(s,a)$, suppose the agent chooses a distribution over actions $d$ to maximize $H\left(d\right)+E_{a\sim d}\left[Q\right(s,a\left)\right]$. Then the agent takes a random action $a\sim d$ and receives the normal reward plus an extra reward equal to $H\left(d\right)$ (so that the learned $Q$ takes into account the entropy objective). As far as I can tell, this algorithm works for maximizing the original reward plus the entropy of the agent's sequence of actions.

I'm not sure how well this works as a general solution to the informed oversight problem. It replaces the original objective with a slightly different one, and I don't have intuitions about whether this new objective is harder to optimize than the original one. Still, it doesn't seem a lot harder to optimize. I'm also not sure whether it's always possible to set $\gamma$ low enough to incentivize good performance on the original objective $b$ and high enough for $v$ to be strongly concave enough to isolate a unique solution. It's also not clear whether the strong concavity will be sufficient: even if the global maximum of $v$ is desirable, other strategies A might use could approximately optimize $v$ while being bad. So while there's some selection pressure against bad strategies, it might not be enough.