Not sure how "AI researchers quitting" is bottlenecked by funding. Some of them probably do it because they like the job, not because they need the money -- they could probably find another computer science job if they wanted.
I guess if we provided a generous UBI for all current AI researchers, many of them would quit, but think about the incentives this would create for others.
You're right.
AI researchers quitting their jobs doesn't seem directly bottlenecked by funding.
Though awareness-raising campaigns (eg. by AI ethics people, or Pause AI people) to motivate researchers to quit their jobs are funding constrained.
Note: I guess part of the downvotes came from the post being a bare skeleton outline when I published it.
I added a td;lr and extra explanations based on someone's feedback.
Let me know if anything is still unclear! Happy to read your questions.
This is a quick write-up of part 2 of my VAISU talk. See also part 1, and longer post.
td;lr A rough framework for understanding the ways AGI gets selected for,
and the ways communities can constrain that selection by acting now.
Types of feedback loops through which AGI[1] functionality is gradually selected:
These loops are mutually reinforcing, in where and at what scale, they select for AGI.[1]
Prerequisites[2] for that selection to occur:
AI companies compete on, and are bottlenecked by, the availability of each prerequisite.
The more we can restrict the data, workers, misuses, and compute available to AI companies (and other groups), the more we restrict paths toward AGI.
This is in rough order from least to most diffuse harms:
There is ambiguity across these categories.
Eg. Underpaying digital freelancers and taking their unique works to train AI involve both directly personal and institution-wide harms. And while the misuse of autonomous network-centric weapons by national militaries is harmful society-wide, the data surveillance of individual citizens targeted by drones is personal.
Less diffuse harms are easier to trace and for individuals affected to act upon.
What follows roughly is that we can make more traction by starting at 1.
That is, first help scale projects to inform people how they are personally harmed, and enable them to take targeted legal actions. People informed of harms directed at them are usually more motivated to act effectively to restrict those harms, than people informed of abstract distributed harms (climate change activism, notwithstanding).
Projects to restrict increasingly diffuse harms of 2, 3, and 4 take more time to coordinate.
But to comprehensively restrict the selective pressures, those projects are needed too.
Eventually, such parallel actions could converge on converge on robust bans:
More thoughts from my research mentor, Forrest Landry:
"Models need to be domain restricted. Ie, only train on one domain of interaction, and then only allow one domain of input and output – preferably different ones that are NOT in any way feedback coupled to one another through any even indirect routing of just the physical universe. Ie, that any different domain indirection coupling must and can only occur through human intermediation. Ie, humans provide inputs, and the machine outputs in a different domain of action."
Broader movements that are acting to restrict each prerequisite:
What are those movements resisting AI each bottlenecked by?
Funding.
No-strings attached.
A more precise way of redefining AGI is 'self-sufficient learning machinery'.
The selection mechanisms don't correspond one-on-one with the prerequisites.